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Returning to Hazelwood’s Core: A New Approach to Restrictions on SchoolSponsored Speech
Emily Gold Waldman∗
Nearly twenty years ago in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,1 the
Supreme Court – in upholding the constitutionality of a public high school principal’s
censorship of a student newspaper produced in a journalism class – held that “educators
do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and
content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”2 Since then,
Hazelwood’s “reasonable relat[ion] to legitimate pedagogical concerns” standard has
been invoked in a tremendous array of school speech cases. Not only has it been
employed in a wide variety of student speech contexts,3 but courts have also relied upon
it in cases involving public schools’ textbook selections and curricular choices,4 teachers’
in-class speech,5 and even the speech of outside entities (such as recruiters and
advertisers) in the school setting.6
In the process, two major circuit splits have developed. First, the circuits have
divided over how far Hazelwood’s reach should extend, particularly in terms of whether
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484 U.S. 260 (1988).
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Id. at 273.
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See infra text accompanying notes 60-64; 260-91.
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Hazelwood is applicable to teachers’ classroom speech.7 Second, a sharp split has
developed over whether Hazelwood goes so far as to permit viewpoint-based speech
restrictions, which are generally prohibited under the First Amendment.8 Both of these
questions have given rise to rich parallel lines of scholarship.9 The two issues, however,
are rarely considered in tandem.

7

Compare Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized School Dist. R-2, 147 F.3d 718 (8th Cir. 1998) (applying
Hazelwood to teachers’ in-class speech); Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d
719 (2d Cir. 1994) (same); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448 (1st Cir. 1993) (same); Bishop v. Aronov, 926
F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991) (same); Miles v. Denver Public Schools, 944 F.2d 773 (10th Cir. 1991) (same);
Webster v. New Lenox School Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d 1004 (7th Cir. 1990) (same); with Mayer v. Monroe
Cty. Comm. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 2007) (applying the approach set forth in Pickering v. Board
of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), to teachers’ in-class speech); Cockrel v. Shelby Cty. Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d
1036 (6th Cir. 2001) (same); Boring v. Buncombe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc)
(same); Kirkland v. Northside Independent School Dist., 890 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1989) (same). See infra
text accompanying notes 99-173.
8
Compare Fleming v. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 928-29 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that
Hazelwood permits viewpoint discrimination); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448 (1st Cir. 2002) (same) with
Peck v. Baldwinsville Central Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617, 631-633 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that Hazelwood
prohibits viewpoint discrimination); Planned Parenthood of So. Nevada, Inc. v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 941
F.2d 817, 829 (9th Cir. 1991) (same). See infra text accompanying notes 174-92.
9
On the question of what legal standard should apply to teachers’ classroom speech, see, for example,
Emily Holmes Davis, Note and Recent Development, Protecting the “Marketplace of Ideas”: The First
Amendment and Public School Teachers’ Classroom Speech, 3 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 335 (2005); R.
Weston Donehower, Note, Boring Lessons: Defining the Limits of a Teacher’s First Amendment Right to
Speak Through the Classroom, 102 MICH. L. REV. 517 (2003); Martin H. Redish & Kevin Finnerty, What
Did You Learn in School Today? Free Speech, Values Inculcation, and the Democratic-Educational
Paradox, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 62 (2002); Todd A. DeMitchell, Counterpoint: a New Balance of In-Class
Speech: No Longer Just a “Mouthpiece,” 31 J. L. & EDUC. 473 (2002); Karen C. Daly, Balancing Act:
Teachers’ Classroom Speech and the First Amendment, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 1 (2001); Theresa J. Bryant, May
We Teach Tolerance? Establishing the Parameters of Academic Freedom in Public Schools, 60 U. PITT. L.
REV. 579 (1999); William G. Buss, Academic Freedom and Freedom of Speech: Communicating the
Curriculum, 2 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 213 (1999) [hereinafter Buss, Academic Freedom]; W. Stuart
Stuller, High School Academic Freedom: The Evolution of a Fish Out of Water, 77 NEB. L. REV. 301
(1998); Gregory A. Clarick, Note, Public School Teachers and the First Amendment: Protecting the Right
to Teach, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693 (1990).
As to the viewpoint discrimination issue, see, for example, Lisa Shaw Roy, Inculcation, Bias, and
Viewpiont Discrimination in Public Schools, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 647 (2005); Susannah Barton Tobin, Note,
Divining Hazelwood: The Need for a Viewpoint Neutrality Requirement in School Speech Cases, 39 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 217 (2004); Katie Hammett, School Shootings, Ceramic Tiles, and Hazelwood: The
Continuing Lessons of the Columbine Tragedy, 55 ALA. L. REV. 393 (2004); Denise Daugherty, Note &
Comment, Free Speech in Public Schools: Has the Supreme Court Created a Haven for Viewpoint
Discrimination in School-Sponsored Speech, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1061 (2004); Samuel P. Jordan,
Comment, Viewpoint Restrictions and School-Sponsored Student Speech: Avenues for Heightened
Protection, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1555 (2003); Janna J. Annest, Note & Comment, Only the News That’s Fit
to Print: The Effect of Hazelwood on the First Amendment Viewpoint-Neutrality Requirement in Public
School-Sponsored Forums, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1227 (2002); William G. Buss, School Newspapers, Public
Forum, and the First Amendment, 74 IOWA L. REV. 505 (1989) [hereinafter Buss, School Newspapers].
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This article argues that these two issues are related in a critical, yet largely
unexamined, way: the extension of Hazelwood into contexts beyond the student speech
realm has severely muddled the question of whether Hazelwood permits viewpoint-based
speech restrictions. Indeed, out of the five circuits that have explicitly reached the
question of whether Hazelwood permits viewpoint discrimination, three did so in cases
that did not even involve student speech. Moreover, the varying speech contexts in which
the circuits have first confronted this question have led to divergent results. The First
Circuit, for instance, first addressed the viewpoint discrimination issue in a case where it
applied Hazelwood to teacher speech; it concluded that Hazelwood generally permitted
viewpoint discrimination. On the other hand, the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits both first
reached the question in cases where they applied Hazelwood to the speech of outside
entities (respectively, yearbook advertisers and recruiters at a career fair), and they both
concluded that Hazelwood generally forbade viewpoint discrimination. This is not a
coincidence. Rather, the significantly different interests implicated by teacher speech and
outside entity speech directly contributed to these conflicting interpretations of
Hazelwood. In short, Hazelwood has been pulled in so many directions that its
underlying standard has lost coherence.
In this article, I suggest that this conundrum can be untangled by returning to
Hazelwood’s core as a student speech case. I first argue that Hazelwood’s reach has been
significantly over-extended, and that it should be applied only in student speech cases.
Not only did Hazelwood arise in the student speech context, but its rationale and
approach are in fact uniquely suited to that context.

3

Removing these other categories of speech from the Hazelwood equation, in turn,
helps shed light on the persistent debate over whether Hazelwood permits viewpointbased discrimination in addition to content-based discrimination. In other words,
resolution of the circuit split over Hazelwood’s reach helps to resolve the circuit split
over whether Hazelwood permits viewpoint-related speech restrictions. Once we return
to Hazelwood’s origins as a student speech case, and to the text of Hazelwood itself, I
argue that it becomes relatively clear that Hazelwood contemplated the permissibility of
viewpoint-based restrictions on student speech in certain circumstances. The real issue is
not whether viewpoint discrimination is permitted by Hazelwood, but when.
Answering this question, in turn, requires a more nuanced analysis of (1) what it
means for student speech to occur in a “school-sponsored” context, such that, as the
Hazelwood Court put it, “students, parents, and other members of the public might
reasonably perceive [the speech] to bear the imprimatur of the school”10; and (2) which
types of restrictions on student speech are “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns.” I argue that the courts should adopt a sliding-scale approach in which the
level of school sponsorship is weighed against the nature of and justification for the
speech restriction. Where the perception of school sponsorship is at its highest – because
the student speech at issue will affect the substance of other students’ classroom learning
experience or permanently transform the physical appearance of the school – then a
school should receive broad latitude to restrict the speech, even if its restrictions reflect
viewpoint-based discrimination. By contrast, where the perception of school imprimatur
is lower – because the student speech, despite its occurrence in a school-sponsored
context, is clearly attributable to a particular student and will transform neither other
10

Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
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students’ in-class experience nor the permanent appearance of the school – then any
viewpoint-based restrictions imposed by the school should be subjected to more rigorous
examination.
This article proceeds in five parts. First, I discuss the Hazelwood decision in
depth. Next, I discuss the various contexts in which Hazelwood has been applied, and the
circuit split that has developed over how broadly it should reach.11 Third, I describe the
circuit split that has developed over whether Hazelwood permits viewpoint-based speech
restrictions, highlighting the disparate speech contexts in which the circuits have reached
their divergent conclusions. Fourth, I argue that the two splits are linked by a connective
thread: the over-extension of Hazelwood. I discuss why Hazelwood is uniquely suited to
the student speech context, and why other doctrines – namely, the Pickering-Connick12
public employee analysis for teachers’ classroom speech and basic public forum analysis
for outside entities’ speech – provide better frameworks for analyzing school speech
restrictions as to non-students, and I draw on the Supreme Court’s very recent decision in
Garcetti v. Ceballos13 to support this view. Finally, having returned to Hazelwood’s

11

My discussion, and indeed this entire article, is focused on K-12 public schools, the context in which
Hazelwood itself arose. The Seventh Circuit, in an en banc opinion, recently held that Hazelwood is also
generally applicable in the university setting, over the objections of a strong dissent. See Hosty v. Carter,
412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc). Several other circuits have also pointed in this direction by
invoking Hazelwood in cases involving speech restrictions at the university level. See, e.g., Bishop v.
Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991); Vanderhurst v. Colorado Mountain College District, 208 F.3d 908
(10th Cir. 2000). Not surprisingly, the question of whether Hazelwood should apply to the university
setting, or should instead be limited to the K-12 public school context in which it arose, has given rise to
much scholarship, particularly in Hosty’s aftermath. See, e.g., Edward L. Carter, Kevin R. Kemper, and
Barbara L. Morgenstern, Applying Hazelwood to College Speech: Forum Doctrine and Government Speech
in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 157 (2006); Jessica Lyons, Note, Defining Freedom of
the College Press After Hosty v. Carter, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1771 (2006). Although I draw upon some of the
university cases insofar as they relate to my own discussion of whether Hazelwood should apply to
teachers’ classroom speech, the separate question of Hazelwood’s applicability in the university setting as
opposed to the K-12 setting is beyond the scope of this article.
12
See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
13
126 S. Ct. 1951.
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core as a doctrine governing student speech, I set forth my proposal for a sliding-scale
framework within which restrictions on student speech can be evaluated.
I.

The Hazelwood Decision
The Hazelwood dispute began when the principal of Hazelwood East High

School – located in St. Louis County, Missouri – received copies of the page proofs for
the upcoming May 13, 1983 issue of the Spectrum, Hazelwood East High School’s
newspaper.14 The Spectrum was written and edited by the students in the high school’s
Journalism II class, and was largely funded by the district’s Board of Education.15 A
faculty member served as the journalism teacher and newspaper adviser, and typically
provided the principal with copies of the page proofs for review prior to each issue’s
publication.16
When Hazelwood East’s principal saw the copies of the May 13 page proofs, he
was troubled by two of the articles. One article discussed three pregnant students at the
high school, and the principal was concerned that the references to sexual activity and
birth control were inappropriate for some of the school’s younger students and that the
students might be identifiable from the text, even though pseudonyms had been used.17
The other article discussed the impact of divorce on some students at the school; here, the
principal was concerned that the article included a student’s complaints about her father
without having provided her parents with an opportunity to respond to these comments or
to consent to their publication.18 Believing that there was no time to make changes to
these stories, the principal ordered the faculty adviser to pull the pages from the issue on
14

Id. at 263.
Id. at 262-63.
16
Id. at 263.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 263-64.
15
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which these two articles appeared.19 The adviser complied, and the issue was released
without the two pages in question.20 Three students on the Spectrum staff then filed suit,
alleging that the censorship of these articles had violated their First Amendment rights.21
At the time the Hazelwood East students filed their lawsuit, there was a single
Supreme Court decision addressing school restrictions on student speech: Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District.22 There, the Supreme Court had upheld
the right of students to wear black armbands to school in protesting the Vietnam War.23
Stating that “[i]t can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,”24 the
Court concluded that the students had a constitutional right to wear their armbands
(which the Court deemed “pure speech”25) unless doing so would “materially and
substantially” disrupt the work of the school or invade the rights of others.26 Thus,
because the armbands, while causing “discussion outside of the classrooms,” had not
disrupted classroom work nor intruded upon the lives of others, they had to be allowed.27
Applying Tinker to the Hazelwood dispute, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the
high school principal’s censorship of two pages in the Spectrum had been
unconstitutional, reversing the district court’s ruling that the censorship was justified.28
The court held that the Spectrum had functioned as a public forum for student viewpoints,
and that there was no reasonable basis upon which the principal could have forecast that
19

Id. at 264.
Id.
21
Id.
22
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
23
Id. at 514.
24
Id. at 506.
25
Id. at 508.
26
Id. at 513.
27
Id. at 514.
28
Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1374-76 (8th Cir. 1986). Id. at 1374.
20

7

the publication of the articles “would have materially disrupted classwork or given rise to
substantial disorder in the school.”29 Nor would the articles’ publication have met the
alternative justification recognized by Tinker: the invasion of the rights of other students,
which the Eighth Circuit narrowly construed as referring only to situations in which
“publication of th[e] speech could result in tort liability for the school.”30 Accordingly,
the court ruled in the Hazelwood students’ favor on their First Amendment claim,
prompting the school district to file a petition for certiorari, which was granted.
By the time Hazelwood reached the Supreme Court a year later, the Supreme
Court had issued a second decision involving students’ First Amendment rights: Bethel
School District No. 403 v. Fraser. 31 In Fraser, a high school student had been
disciplined for the speech that he delivered at a school assembly, in which he nominated a
fellow student for a student elective office.32 His speech used an “elaborate, graphic, and
explicit sexual metaphor”: he stated the candidate was “firm in his pants…a man who
takes his point and pounds it in . . . who will go to the very end – even the climax, for
each and every one of you.”33 After the school punished him for giving the speech, the
student filed suit, alleging a First Amendment violation.34 Although the Ninth Circuit
applied Tinker and affirmed the lower court’s ruling in the student’s favor, the Supreme
Court reversed.35 Rather than applying Tinker’s material disruption/invasion of rights
test, the Fraser Court essentially deemed Tinker inapplicable, emphasizing the “marked
distinction between the political ‘message’ of the armbands in Tinker and the sexual
29

Id. at 1375.
Id. at 1376.
31
478 U.S. 675 (1986).
32
Id. at 677.
33
Id. at 678; id. at 687 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
34
Id. at 670.
35
Id. at 679-80.
30
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content of respondent’s speech in this case.”36 Emphasizing that “the penalties imposed
in this case were unrelated to any political viewpoint,” the Court concluded that the First
Amendment did not “prevent school officials from determining that to permit a vulgar
and lewd speech such as respondent’s would undermine the school’s basic educational
mission.”37 It thus rejected the student’s First Amendment argument and ruled in the
school district’s favor.38
Hazelwood presented yet a third factual variation. Unlike Fraser, the speech at
issue was not lewd or vulgar. And unlike Tinker, the speech was not simply the personal
expression of individual students; it was instead being communicated through a schoolsponsored activity: a newspaper produced by a journalism class. Pulling together strands
of Tinker and Fraser, the Hazelwood Court began by noting that although public school
students did not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate,” the First Amendment rights of students in the public schools were
“not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.”39 The
Hazelwood Court went on – in section II.A of its analysis40 – to conclude, through
application of general public forum doctrine, that the Spectrum was not a forum for
public expression by students.41 Rather, it was “part of the educational curriculum and a
‘regular classroom activity.’”42 This, in turn, led the Court to conclude that “school

36

Id.
Id. at 685.
38
Id. at 687.
39
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266.
40
I note the headings that the Hazelwood Court used to structure its opinion because, as discussed infra, I
believe that they help clarify the scope of the Court’s holding. See infra text accompanying notes 219-221.
41
Id. at 267-270.
42
Id. at 268.
37
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officials were entitled to regulate the contents of the Spectrum in any reasonable
manner.”43
What, then, qualified as a “reasonable manner” of regulation? In section II.B, the
Hazelwood Court left general public forum doctrine behind to address this issue. First,
the Court again emphasized the distinction between “whether the First Amendment
requires a school to tolerate particular student speech” (the Tinker question) and “whether
the First Amendment requires a school affirmatively to promote student speech” (the
Hazelwood question).44 The Court explained:
The former question addresses educators’ ability to silence a student’s personal
expression that happens to occur on the school premises. The latter question
concerns educators’ authority over school-sponsored publications, theatrical
productions, and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members of
the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school. These
activities may fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum, whether or
not they occur in a traditional classroom setting, so long as they are supervised by
faculty members and designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student
participants and audiences.45
As to this latter category of speech, the Court concluded that educators could impose
restrictions “as long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns.”46 Such concerns included, for instance, (1) ensuring that “participants learn
whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach”; (2) shielding readers and listeners
from material that might “be inappropriate for their level of maturity,” and (3) generally

43

Id. at 270. As discussed further below, the Supreme Court explained that public schools are not
traditional public forums (such as streets, parks, and the like), and can be deemed “public forums only if
school authorities have ‘by policy or practice’ opened those facilities ‘for indiscriminate use by the general
public’ . . . or by some segment of the public such as student organizations. If the facilities have instead
been reserved for other intended purposes, ‘communicative or otherwise,’ then no public forum has been
created, and school officials may impose reasonable restrictions on the speech of students, teachers, and
other members of the school community.” Id. at 267 (citing Perry Education Assoc. v. Perry Local
Educators Assoc., 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983)).
44
Id. at 270-71.
45
Id. at 271.
46
Id. at 273.
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disassociating the school from any speech that (a) was “ungrammatical, poorly written,
inadequately researched, biased, or prejudiced, vulgar or profane,” (b) could be seen as
“advocat[ing] drug or alcohol use, irresponsible sex, or conduct otherwise inconsistent
with the shared values of a civilized social order,” or (c) could “associate the school with
any position other than neutrality on matters of political controversy.”47
In justifying this approach, the Hazelwood Court highlighted the negative
consequences that it envisioned were schools not granted this level of discretion over
school-sponsored student speech. First, the schools would be constrained from their role
as a “principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for
later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.”48
Second, in direct response to the dissent’s suggestion that Tinker uniformly provided the
appropriate test for school restrictions on student speech,49 the Court argued that this
would require schools to “open their newspapers to all student expression that does not
threaten ‘material disruption of classwork’ or violation of ‘rights that are protected by
law,’ regardless of how sexually explicit, racially intemperate, or personally insulting that
expression otherwise might be.”50 Schools would likely prefer to shut student
newspapers down altogether, the Court predicted, rather than permitting such views to be
circulated under their auspices.51
Pursuant to its newly-articulated “reasonable relation to a legitimate pedagogical
concern” test, the Hazelwood Court proceeded to rule in favor of the school district.52 As

47

Id. at 271-72.
Id. at 272.
49
Id. at 283 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
50
Id. at 276 & n.9.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 274-76.
48
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to the teen pregnancy article, the Court held that the principal’s censorship was
reasonably related to shielding “14-year-old freshmen” and perhaps their “even younger
brothers and sisters,” who might read the paper if it were brought home, from the article’s
frank discussion of the teenage girls’ sexual histories and use or non-use of birth
control.53 Additionally, the Court stated that the principal might reasonably have been
concerned that the article had failed to adequately protect the teenage girls’ anonymity or
to provide their boyfriends and parents (who were mentioned in the article) the chance to
offer a response or consent to the publication.54 Similarly, as to the divorce article, the
Court found that the principal could reasonably have concluded that the student’s father
was entitled to an opportunity to defend himself as a matter of journalistic fairness.”55
The Court thus concluded that the principal “could reasonably have concluded that these
articles had not sufficiently mastered those portions of the Journalism II curriculum that
pertained to the treatment of controversial issues and personal attacks.”56 This, in turn,
made the principal’s censorship of the articles reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns, and therefore constitutional.57

II.

Hazelwood’s Broad Reach
Hazelwood immediately changed the landscape for assessing the constitutionality

of school restrictions on student speech. Taken together, Tinker and Hazelwood
essentially divided the student speech universe in two: student speech that merely
occurred on school premises could only be restricted if it caused a material disruption or
53

Id. at 274-75.
Id. at 274.
55
Id. at 275.
56
Id. at 276.
57
Id.
54
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invaded others’ rights; while student speech disseminated through a school-sponsored
context could be restricted as long as the school had a legitimate pedagogical reason for
doing so.58 Hazelwood itself made clear that this latter category should be construed
broadly, encompassing not only classroom activities and official school-sponsored
publications and productions, but also any “other expressive activities that students,
parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of
the school,” provided that they are supervised by faculty members and designed to teach
particular knowledge or skills to students.59
And, indeed, over the past nineteen years, Hazelwood has been invoked in a
tremendous array of student speech cases, in almost every conceivable context from the
kindergarten to the high school level. Examples, each of which I return to in Section V,
include:
•

A kindergartner who sued when, after he created a poster for a school
assignment to illustrate ways of saving the environment, his school displayed
his poster in a way that concealed its depiction of Jesus Christ;60

•

An elementary school student who sued when his school refused to allow him
to distribute candy canes with religious messages during a classroom holiday
party;61

•

A high school student who sued when his school disqualified his candidacy
for student council presidency after he delivered a speech at a school assembly

58

Fraser, in turn, can be viewed as applying to the sub-category of cases in which the speech at issue is so
vulgar and offensive, and so lacking in political content, that no constitutional protection attaches when it is
uttered in the school setting. Of course, had Fraser been decided after Hazelwood, perhaps the Supreme
Court would have simply applied Hazelwood (given that the speech was delivered at a school-sponsored
assembly) and upheld the restriction as reasonably related to a legitimate pedagogical purpose. Indeed, the
Fraser Court gestured toward the importance of school sponsorship in stating that “[a] high school
assembly or classroom is no place for a sexually explicit monologue.” Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685. The
Fraser Court did not, however, rest its holding on the fact of school sponsorship, a concept that did not
come fully into focus until Hazelwood.
59
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
60
Peck v. Baldwinsville Central School District, 426 F.3d 617 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that the school’s
actions did not satisfy Hazelwood). See infra text accompanying notes 184-85; 285-89.
61
Walz v. Egg Harbor Township Bd. of Educ., 342 F.3d 271 (holding that the school’s actions satisfied
Hazelwood) (3d Cir. 2003). See infra text accompanying notes 274-78.
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in which he stated, among other things, that “[t]he administration plays tricks
with your mind and they hope you won’t notice. For example, why does [the
assistant principal] stutter when he is on the intercom? He doesn’t have a
speech impediment. If you want to break the iron grip of this school, vote for
me for president.”62
•

Several Columbine High School students and their parents, who sued when
the school refused to hang the tiles that they had created as part of a tilepainting project to commemorate the April 1999 massacre carried out by two
Columbine students;63 and

•

A high-school student who sued after her school removed the religious murals
that she had painted on school walls as part of a high school beautification
project.64

As disparate as these cases are, they all share a common thread: they involve
restrictions on student speech in various school-sponsored contexts. It makes perfect
sense, then, that Hazelwood was employed to assess each of these disputes.
More surprising, however, is that numerous courts have also been applying
Hazelwood in cases that do not involve student speech. Indeed, in 1992 – a mere four
years after Hazelwood was decided – Rosemary Salomone described this trend, writing
that “just about any aspect of school sponsored activity (newspapers, career days,
elective courses) conducted anywhere in the school (classrooms, hallways) is considered
to be a nonpublic forum subject to the reasonableness standard of Hazelwood.”65 This
phenomenon has only increased since then, with numerous courts apparently concluding
that all speech that can be considered “school sponsored” – regardless of whether it is
student speech, teacher classroom speech, outside entity speech, or speech that reflects
62

Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that the school’s actions satisfied Hazelwood).
See infra text accompanying notes 290-92.
63
Fleming v. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that school’s actions
satisfied Hazelwood). See infra text accompanying notes 189-91; 279-83.
64
Bannon v. Sch. Dist. of Palm Beach Cty., 387 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that the school’s
actions satisfied Hazelwood). See infra text accompanying notes 203-16; 279-83.
65
Rosemary C. Salomone, Free Speech and School Governance in the Wake of Hazelwood, 26 GA. L. REV.
253, 316 (1992).
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district-level decisions about textbooks and curricula – falls under Hazelwood’s umbrella.
Below, in order to set the stage for my argument, I discuss the various non-studentspeech contexts in which Hazelwood has been applied, and the circuit splits that have
developed in each of these areas.
A.

Textbook/Curriculum Section

The courts are generally conflicted about whether Hazelwood’s “reasonable
relat[ion] to a legitimate pedagogical purpose” standard applies to school districts’
decisions about textbooks and curricula, sometimes even issuing mixed messages within
a single opinion. Those courts that have concluded that Hazelwood is inapplicable here
have done so on the explicit grounds that textbook and curricular decisions simply reflect
pure government speech, and thus cannot violate the speech rights of others. By contrast,
the courts that have applied Hazelwood here seem to have implicitly interpreted
Hazelwood as announcing a generally applicable “reasonableness” standard for all school
district decisions about speech-related matters. Although the splits over textbooks and
curricula have not yet entirely risen to the surface, an examination of the decisions on this
topic makes clear that divisions are percolating.
As to textbook selection, only two circuits have reached the issue of whether
Hazelwood applies, and they have reached opposite conclusions. The Fifth Circuit
recently confronted this question in Chiras v. Miller,66 in which a textbook author and
high school student brought First Amendment claims after the Texas State Board of
Education refused to approve the textbook author’s environmental science textbook.67
The plaintiffs argued that this refusal, which they alleged to have stemmed from the
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432 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 607-608.

15

influence of conservative think tanks, violated Hazelwood. 68 The Fifth Circuit, noting
that “there is no strong consensus among the circuit courts regarding the application of
First Amendment principles to the selection of curricular materials by school boards,”
engaged in a detailed analysis of whether Hazelwood was applicable here.69 It held that it
was not, stating that when the Board of Education “devises the curriculum for Texas and
selects the textbook with which teachers will teach [] the students, it is the state
speaking.”70 This rendered Hazelwood inapplicable, the Fifth Circuit reasoned, because a
“necessary precondition” of Hazelwood was that some sort of forum for the expression of
others had been created in the first place.71
The Fifth Circuit acknowledged, however, that this conclusion conflicted with
that reached by the Eleventh Circuit in Virgil v. School Board of Columbia County.72
There, when parents filed suit after the school board removed a previously approved
textbook from an elective high school course due to complaints from other parents that
the book contained sexually explicit material (namely, passages from Lysistrata and The
Miller’s Tale), the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Hazelwood provided “direct
guidance.”73 It broadly characterized Hazelwood as “establish[ing] a relatively lenient
test for regulation of expression which ‘may fairly be characterized as part of the school
curriculum,’” and did not discuss Hazelwood’s specific genesis in the student speech
context.74 In applying Hazelwood, the Virgil court ultimately concluded that the Board’s
action was constitutional, stating that the textbook decision was a curricular decision that
68
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Id. at 614-16.
70
Id. at 614.
71
Id. at 617.
72
Id. (citing Virgil v. Sch. Bd. of Columbia Cty., 862 F.2d 1517 (11th Cir. 1989)).
73
Virgil, 862. F.2d at 1521.
74
Id.
69

16

would be perceived as bearing the imprimatur of the school, and that it had been
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns – namely, the “explicit sexuality
and excessively vulgar language in the selections.”75 Thus, although both the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits reached the same ultimate results – upholding the constitutionality of
the school districts’ actions – they took divergent routes in getting there.
The case law surrounding Hazelwood’s applicability to curriculum selection is
murkier. The Third Circuit has essentially staked out the position that Hazelwood’s
reasonableness standard does not apply to curricular decisions. It adopted this view in
one of the first post-Hazelwood cases to raise this issue: Bradley v. Pittsburgh Board of
Education.76 There, a high school teacher brought a First Amendment claim after her
school prohibited her from organizing her classroom according to the “Learnball”
technique, which involved dividing the class into teams, giving students the opportunity
to elect their team leaders and establish class rules, and setting up a system of rewards
including radio playing in the classroom.77 “[W]e do not have to delineate the scope of
academic freedom afforded to teachers under the First Amendment” here, the Third
Circuit ruled, because “no court has found that teachers’ First Amendment rights extend
to choosing their own curriculum or classroom management techniques in contravention
of school policy or dictates.”78 In 1998, the Third Circuit reaffirmed this view in
Edwards v. California University of Pennsylvania,79 holding – in an opinion authored by
then-Judge Alito – that Hazelwood did not apply to school administrators’ decisions
75
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about “what will be taught in the classroom,” and that it therefore did not need to engage
in the Hazelwood analysis.80
Subsequent to the Bradley Court’s 1990 pronouncement that no court had
recognized teachers’ First Amendment rights to choose their own curriculum, some
courts did begin to move in that direction. In particular, the Tenth Circuit suggested in
Vanderhurst v. Colorado Mountain College District81 that it disagreed with the argument
that “a teacher enjoys no First Amendment right to determine the educational content of a
course,” noting the Supreme Court’s statement in Keyishian v. Board of Regents (a case
involving a challenge brought by public university professors to a state law requiring
them to certify that they were not Communists) that academic freedom is “a special
concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of
orthodoxy over the classroom.”82 The Vanderhurst Court went on to state that, at least
for purposes of the instant case, it viewed Hazelwood as providing the appropriate
standard for assessing whether the termination of an instructor who had “attempt[ed] to
communicate course content at odds with the chosen curriculum” was constitutional.83
Other courts have issued mixed messages as to whether Hazelwood applies to
curricular choices, suggesting both that curricular choices reflect pure government speech
and that Hazelwood is still somehow applicable. In Bishop v. Aronov,84 for example, the
Eleventh Circuit stated both that Hazelwood was applicable to a case involving a school’s
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restrictions on the content of a particular course,85 and that when a teacher and school
disagree about the content of a course, the school “must have the final say,” because
schools must have “command of their own courses.”86 Similarly, a recent Northern
District of California decision first stated that “teachers do not have a first amendment
right to determine what curriculum will be taught in the classroom,”87 but then also stated
that the plaintiff teacher (who had sued over restrictions placed on his use of
supplemental classroom materials that had religious content) “might still state a claim if
he alleges restrictions which are not ‘reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns.’”88
The most recent development on this front comes from the Seventh Circuit, which
had initially straddled the line as to whether Hazelwood applied to curricular choices, but
implicitly retreated from this position in January 2007. In Webster v. New Lenox School
District,89 a 1990 case in which a teacher alleged that his First Amendment rights had
been violated when the school district prohibited him from teaching creationism in the
classroom,90 the Seventh Circuit issued an ambiguous decision. It first stated that the
school board had the authority “to set the curriculum,”91 and that the “first amendment is
not a teacher license for uncontrolled expression at variance with established curricular
content.”92 But it then proceeded to apply Hazelwood, stating that that the school
district’s prohibition on the teaching of creationism had been related to the school board’s
important and legitimate pedagogical interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause
85
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violation.93 The Seventh Circuit thus left unclear whether it had invoked Hazelwood at
the end of its decision essentially to gild the lily, or whether it genuinely believed that the
school district needed to satisfy the Hazelwood standard in order to prevail against the
teacher’s claim. In the 2007 case of Mayer v. Monroe County Community School
Corporation94 – which involved the related issue of constitutional protection for teachers’
classroom speech – the Seventh Circuit essentially answered that question.
Characterizing Webster as simply having held that the teacher “did not have a
constitutional right to introduce his own views on the subject but must stick to the
prescribed curriculum – not only the prescribed subject matter, but the prescribed
perspective on that subject matter, the Mayer court did not even acknowledge Webster’s
previous invocation of Hazelwood. 95 Mayer thus suggests that to the extent the Seventh
Circuit previously deemed Hazelwood applicable to curricular choices, it no longer does
so.96
Given the evolving and sometimes amorphous nature of circuit decisions on this
issue, it is hard to draw firm classifications as to which circuits view Hazelwood as fully
applicable to curricular selections. Much of the murkiness, I believe, stems from the fact
that the curricular selection question often blends into the question of when schools can
constitutionally restrict teachers’ in-school speech. While the Third Circuit in Bradley
gestured toward distinguishing between these two issues,97 the Seventh, Tenth, and
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Eleventh Circuits have drawn no such distinction.98 As such, turning to an assessment of
the circuit split over whether Hazelwood applies to teachers’ in-school speech helps to
shed light on the incipient split over curriculum selection.
B.

Teachers’ Classroom Speech

The division among the circuits as to Hazelwood’s reach is starker when it comes
to public school teachers’ in-class speech, but it continues to evolve. Since Hazelwood
was decided, the First, Second, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have explicitly
applied it to restrictions on teachers’ in-school speech (regardless of whether that speech
related to curricular decisions or consisted of stray classroom comments), while the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have instead chosen to apply the approach set forth in
Pickering v. Board of Education99 and its progeny for assessing the constitutionality of
speech restrictions on public employees. Most recently, as noted above and discussed
further below, the Seventh Circuit, having previously applied Hazelwood to teachers’
classroom speech, suddenly switched gears and applied Pickering instead. Meanwhile,
the Third and Ninth Circuits have not definitively weighed in (although there are clues as
to their inclinations) on the issue, and the D.C. Circuit has not reached it.
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The initial circuit to apply Hazelwood to teachers’ in-school speech was the
Seventh Circuit in its 1990 Webster decision, which – as noted above – briefly referred to
Hazelwood at the very end of its opinion about school restrictions on the teaching of
creationism.100 The Eleventh Circuit similarly invoked Hazelwood the following year in
Aronov, in which it acknowledged that Hazelwood had addressed restrictions on student
speech rather than teacher speech, but stated that “insofar as [Hazelwood] covers the
extent to which an institution may limit in-school expressions which suggest the school’s
approval, we adopt the Court’s reasoning as suitable to our ends.”101
Shortly thereafter, the Tenth Circuit followed suit in Miles v. Denver Public
Schools.102 There, a public high school teacher sued after being disciplined for
commenting to his ninth grade government class that “I don’t think in 1967 you would
have seen two students making out on the tennis court.”103 This comment – a reference
to a widely-circulated rumor that two students had been seen having sex on the tennis
court the previous day – prompted complaints from the parents of the two students in
question.104 In assessing the teacher’s claim that the resultant discipline had violated his
First Amendment rights, the Tenth Circuit deemed Hazelwood applicable.105 It
acknowledged that Hazelwood had involved student speech rather than teacher speech,
but stated that “we find no reason to distinguish between the classroom discussion of
students and teachers in applying Hazelwood here. A school’s interests in regulating
classroom speech . . . are implicated regardless of whether that speech comes from a
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teacher or student.”106 The court further found that Hazelwood was satisfied here,
because the impetus for the discipline had been reasonably related to the school’s
pedagogical interests.107
In subsequent years, several circuits joined the trend of applying Hazelwood to
teacher speech. In 1993, expressly relying on Miles, the First Circuit concluded in Ward
v. Hickey108 that Hazelwood should apply where a nontenured teacher sued her school
district when it chose not to reappoint her because of a discussion that she had engaged in
with her ninth grade biology class about the abortion of fetuses with Down’s
Syndrome.109 Citing Miles, the First Circuit reasoned that “a teacher’s statements in class
during an instructional period are . . . part of a curriculum and a regular class activity.
Like [Hazelwood’s] school newspaper, the classroom is not a public forum, and therefore
is subject to reasonable speech regulation.”110 The Second Circuit followed suit in
1994,111 as did the Eighth Circuit in 1998.112
By contrast, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have explicitly held that
the 1967 Pickering decision – which first set out the framework for assessing the
constitutionality of speech restrictions on public employees – applies with full force to
restrictions on teachers’ in-school speech. Pickering, interestingly enough, itself
106
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involved the speech of a public school teacher, although not in the classroom: the
plaintiff was a public school teacher dismissed after sending a letter to a local newspaper
that criticized the school board’s funding decisions.113 The Pickering Court held that this
termination had violated the teacher’s First Amendment rights, explaining that a balance
must be struck “between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon
matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the
efficiency of public services it performs through its employees.”114 It concluded that the
teacher had spoken as a “member of the general public” about an issue of public concern,
that the school district could not show that the teacher’s letter had caused any disruption,
and that his speech had therefore been constitutionally protected.115 The Court further
refined this approach in Connick v. Myers, 116 developing a two-pronged test for assessing
the free speech claims of public employees. The initial threshold question, the Court
explained, is whether the employee was speaking as a citizen on a matter of public
concern; if not, then the First Amendment claim fails at that juncture.117 If so, then the
court must proceed to an evaluation of whether the employee’s First Amendment interest
in making the speech in question outweighed the employer’s justification for limiting it,
an assessment commonly referred to as “Pickering balancing.”118 In 2006, the Supreme
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Court further refined this approach in Garcetti v. Ceballos,119 emphasizing that the initial
threshold inquiry primarily rests on whether the employee was speaking in his capacity as
a citizen, rather than on whether the speech related to a matter of public concern.120
The Fifth Circuit was the first to adopt the view that the Pickering-Connick
framework applied to restrictions on teachers’ in-class speech, holding in 1989 in
Kirkland v. Northside Independent School District121 that this framework applied to a
teacher’s claim that he had been dismissed for using an unapproved reading list.122 The
Kirkland court further concluded that the teacher’s use of his own unapproved reading
list did not raise a matter of public concern, particularly given that he had never spoken
out in public about it or attempted to obtain approval for it.123 The court thus concluded
that his claim could not pass the initial threshold for First Amendment protection, and did
not proceed to a balancing inquiry.124 Although the court mentioned Hazelwood in
passing, it did not substantively evaluate whether Hazelwood, as opposed to Pickering,
provided the applicable framework for the teacher’s claim.125 As of 1989, of course,
none of the above cases applying Hazelwood to teachers’ in-class speech had yet been
decided.
By the time the Fourth Circuit was confronted with the issue in the late 1990s,
however, the above cases choosing to apply Hazelwood rather than Pickering had indeed
been decided. Thus, the Fourth Circuit was presented with a clear choice between
Hazelwood and Pickering – a choice that ultimately prompted the circuit to go en banc.
119
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In the case at issue, Boring v. Buncombe County Board of Education,126 a high school
drama teacher sued when she was transferred after having the students in her advanced
acting class perform a play called “Independence” in a state competition.127 The play
depicted “the dynamics within a dysfunctional, single-parent family – a divorced mother
and three daughters; one a lesbian, another pregnant with an illegitimate child.”128 After
the district court dismissed her claim, a three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit reinstated
it, concluding that Hazelwood provided “the best means of navigating” her claim.129 The
court acknowledged that Hazelwood “directly addressed the free speech rights of
students, not teachers,” but stated that “the rationale that largely animated Hazelwood . . .
appears to apply equally well in the context of a teacher’s play selection for a schoolsponsored drama production.”130 The court concluded that although legitimate
pedagogical reasons might have motivated the school district’s decision to discipline the
teacher for her speech, none had yet been established on the record.131
The Fourth Circuit subsequently heard the case en banc, and in a 7-6 split, ruled
that Pickering should instead apply to teachers’ classroom speech.132 In explaining its
decision to apply the Pickering-Connick framework, the majority reasoned that “[t]his is
not a case concerning pupil speech, as in Hazelwood, either classroom or otherwise. The
case concerns itself exclusively with employee speech, as does Connick.”133 The
majority further concluded that teachers lacked a First Amendment right “to participate in
the makeup of the curriculum of a public high school,” reasoning that
126
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Someone must fix the curriculum of any school, public or private. In the case of a
public school, in our opinion, it is far better public policy, absent a valid statutory
directive on the subject, that the makeup of the curriculum be entrusted to the
local school authorities who are in some sense responsible, rather than to the
teachers, who would be responsible only to the judges.134
By contrast, the dissent (written by the author of the initial majority opinion) continued to
argue that Hazelwood should apply, asserting that the Pickering-Connick framework “did
not provide a workable formula for analyzing whether the First Amendment protects a
teacher’s in class speech . . . . Her speech is neither ordinary employee workplace speech
nor common public debate.”135
In 2001, the Sixth Circuit threw in its lot with the Fourth and Fifth Circuits,
concluding that Pickering should apply to teachers’ in-class speech. In the case at issue,
Cockrel v. Shelby County School District,136 the plaintiff teacher was terminated after,
among other things, inviting celebrity Woody Harrelson to come talk to her fifth grade
class about the environmental benefits of industrial hemp.137 The Sixth Circuit applied
Pickering to her First Amendment claim, acknowledging the circuit split but concluding
that it saw “no reason to part from Pickering when deciding cases involving a teacher’s
in-class speech.”138 The court went on to rule (unlike the Kirkland and Boring courts)
that the teacher’s speech had indeed been constitutionally protected, concluding that the
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speech had related to a matter of public concern and that the Pickering balancing weighed
in the teacher’s favor.139
Finally, as noted above, on January 24, 2007 – in the first circuit court decision to
address this issue following Garcetti’s refinement of the Pickering-Connick framework –
the Seventh Circuit held in Mayer v. Monroe County Community Schools Corporation140
that Pickering and its progeny applied to teachers’ classroom speech. On that basis, the
Seventh Circuit rejected the plaintiff teacher’s First Amendment claim that she had been
terminated for telling her students during a classroom discussion of current events that
she opposed the war in Iraq, holding that she had been speaking in her capacity as an
employee and was therefore unprotected.141
The Third, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have not squarely addressed the issue of how
to evaluate the constitutionality of restrictions on teachers’ in-class speech, but there are
some clues as to how the Third and Ninth Circuits are likely to come out. As noted
above, the Third Circuit quite emphatically ruled in Bradley and Edwards that
Hazelwood is inapplicable to curricular decisions (which reflect pure government speech
and are thus unprotected by the First Amendment), suggesting that the circuit may take a
similar approach to teachers’ in-class speech.142 The signals from the Ninth Circuit,
however, have been more mixed. On the one hand, in Downs v. Los Angeles Unified
School District,143 the Ninth Circuit concluded that a teacher’s posting of anti-gay
messages on a bulletin board near his classroom was not governed by Hazelwood because
139
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the speech at issue was pure government speech. The Downs court stated that the boards
were the property of the school district, that “[o]nly school faculty and staff had access to
post materials on these boards,” and that it was therefore the school district itself
speaking through the bulletin boards. Relying in part on the Third Circuit’s holdings in
Bradley and Edwards, the court concluded that the teacher had “no First Amendment
right to speak for the government,” and that his First Amendment claim therefore
failed.144 The following year, however, the Ninth Circuit held that at least as to teachers’
instructional speech in the classroom, it would assume arguendo that Hazelwood
applied.145
Interestingly, in addition to their division over whether Hazelwood or Pickering
should apply to teachers’ in-class speech, the circuits are not even settled as to which
framework provides greater protection for teacher speech in the first place. The Ninth
Circuit, in deciding to assume arguendo that Hazelwood should apply to teachers’ inclass speech, stated that it was doing so precisely because Hazelwood “appear[ed] to be
more speech protective” than Pickering.146 By contrast, the Tenth Circuit – as well as the
dissenting opinion from the Fourth Circuit in Boring – justified their application of
Hazelwood on grounds that Hazelwood provided less protection for teacher speech, and
correspondingly greater discretion for school districts, which they deemed appropriate.147
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This further lack of consensus indicates how deeply the circuits have fractured
over this question. It also illustrates the complexity of the issue: none of the above courts
explained in detail why they believed that one approach was more speech-protective than
the other, and in fact there is some truth to both positions. Pickering provides much more
protection when the teacher is speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern, and
much less protection – essentially none at all – in all other circumstances. Hazelwood, by
contrast, provides a limited, but consistent, level of protection by generally prohibiting
speech restrictions that are not reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical purposes.
(Of course, the determination of whether Hazelwood permits viewpoint-based restrictions
– the topic that to which I turn in Part III – bears greatly on how speech-protective
Hazelwood ends up being.)
The academic commentary, too, is divided. Certain commentators have argued
that public school teachers’ in-class speech is entitled to significant constitutional
protection – particularly given the Supreme Court’s broad statements about the
importance of academic freedom – and have championed a variety of frameworks to
achieve that goal. Gregory Clarick and Emily Holmes Davis, for example, argue that
neither Hazelwood nor Pickering are speech-protective enough, and that a Tinker-like
standard, under which restrictions on teachers’ classroom speech are permitted only upon
a showing that the speech caused an actual or potential disruption, should apply.148
Karen Daly similarly laments that although the Supreme Court “has spoken approvingly
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in dicta of ‘academic freedom,’ albeit in the context of McCarthy-era statutes,” it has not
provided any precedent directly on point, and that the lower courts – in turning to either
Hazelwood or Pickering to fill the void – have provided insufficient protection for
teachers’ classroom speech.149 She therefore proposes a “mixed procedural-substantive
test” – which she refers to as “Hazelwood flipped” – that evaluates teachers’ free speech
claims on the basis of how much prior notice they received that the speech was
prohibited.150 In support of this approach, Daly argues that “a system that permits
teachers to act as opposing voices within curriculum parameters established by a
popularly elected school board minimizes the potential of either actor to distort their
educational function into brainwashing.”151
Other commentators, however, argue that whatever the appropriate scope of
academic freedom in higher education, the concept of academic freedom is largely
inapplicable to the speech of K-12 public school teachers. Todd DeMitchell, for
example, directly criticizes Daly’s approach on grounds that public school “teachers are
hired to speak for the school board[,] thus furthering the school board’s message, which
is the curriculum.”152 Daly’s notion of a system that provides some room for teachers to
act as opposing voices, DeMitchell argues, thus makes little sense, and would serve only
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to “distance[] the public from their public schools.”153 W. Stuart Stuller similarly likens
the notion of academic freedom for K-12 public school teachers to a “fish out of water,”
stating that in comparison to the role of a university professor, who is charged with the
production of scholarship, a public teacher’s role is to present course materials and serve
as a role model for his students.154 Noting that most disputes over such teachers’ in-class
speech “involve value-based decisions that require a sense of community,” Stuller argues
that these “questions are best resolved through the democratic process,” i.e., the local
school board, rather than through First Amendment claims.155 In a jointly authored
article, Martin Redish and Kevin Finnerty likewise argue that “[a]lthough a teacher’s
First Amendment right allows him to say what he wishes outside the classroom, the
inmates do not run the asylum. If a school board or principal decides that a particular
subject is to be taught in a particular way, individual teachers do not have a constitutional
right in the classroom to preempt the decisions of their superiors.”156 A recent Michigan
Law Review note similarly argues that teachers’ in-class speech should generally receive
no First Amendment protection.157
C.

Speech of Outside Entities

There is a smaller body of case law (and scant commentary) as to the speech of
outside entities – such as recruiters, advertisers, and parents – in school-sponsored
contexts, but the trend here is clearly toward the application of Hazelwood. The Ninth
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and Eleventh Circuits have already moved in this direction, as have several district
courts.
The Eleventh Circuit was the first to apply Hazelwood to the speech of outside
entities in school-sponsored settings, in the 1989 case of Searcey v. Harris.158 There, the
Atlanta Peace Alliance sued the Atlanta School Board over its policy of excluding it from
its Career Day program, while permitting military recruiters to participate.159 The school
board had excluded the Peace Alliance on the basis of its Career Day policy, which stated
(among other things) that participants in the program must have “direct knowledge” of
the career about which they would speak, must have a “present affiliation” with that
career field, and could not criticize or denigrate that career field.160 Without any real
discussion of whether it mattered that Hazelwood had been a student speech case, the
Eleventh Circuit deemed Hazelwood applicable.161 It further concluded, as discussed
infra, that Hazelwood prohibited viewpoint discrimination, such that it would be
unconstitutional for the board to “allow speakers to point out the advantages of a political
career but ban any speaker from pointing out the disadvantages of the same career.”162
The Ninth Circuit subsequently applied Hazelwood to the speech of outside
entities in Planned Parenthood v. Clark County School District,163 in which Planned
Parenthood sued after a school district refused to accept advertisements that it submitted
for publication in the district’s high school newspapers, yearbooks, and athletic
programs.164 Unlike the Eleventh Circuit in Searcey, the Ninth Circuit explicitly
158
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addressed whether it was appropriate to extend Hazelwood outside of the student speech
context. It answered that question in the affirmative, stating that the Hazelwood Court
had specifically “spoke[n] in terms of ‘school-sponsored publications, theatrical
productions, and other expressive activities.’”165 The Ninth Circuit further noted that, at
the beginning of Hazelwood, the Court had stated that unless the school has opened up its
facilities to the general public, “school officials may impose reasonable restrictions on
the speech of students, teachers, and other members of the school community.”166 It thus
concluded that “there is no principled distinction between students’ constitutional rights
and those of Planned Parenthood to access to school-sponsored publications.”167 The
Ninth Circuit went on to hold (as had the Eleventh Circuit in Searcey, and as further
discussed infra) that Hazelwood prohibited viewpoint discrimination.168 Ultimately,
however, it ruled in favor of the school district, reasoning that its actions were
constitutionally permissible because both pro-choice/birth control-related advertisements
and pro-life advertisements had been excluded by district policy.169 Similarly, in
DiLoreto v. Downey Unified School District,170 the Ninth Circuit applied Hazelwood to a
plaintiff’s claim that his First Amendment rights were violated when a school district
refused to post his advertisement displaying the Ten Commandments on the high school
baseball field fence.171
Recently, a new school fundraising trend has given rise to another type of outside
entity speech in the school setting. This trend consists of fund-raisers involving the sale
165
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of bricks or tiles that are going to be placed on some sort of walkway on or near the
school, with the idea that purchasers – typically parents – can have a personal message
inscribed on the brick or tile. In the past two years, this trend has already given rise to
three different district court cases along remarkably similar lines: a parent purchases a
brick or tile, submits a religious message to be inscribed (e.g., “[student name,] Jesus
Loves You”); the school district refuses the submission, and the parent files a First
Amendment claim.172 In all three cases, the district courts turned to Hazelwood for
guidance, and ultimately held that the school districts’ restrictions had reflected
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.173
*

*

*

Two conclusions emerge from an examination of the contexts in which
Hazelwood has been applied in the nearly twenty years since it was decided. First,
Hazelwood’s reach now extends far beyond the student speech context. Second, there is
a clear lack of consensus among the circuits as to precisely where the boundaries of its
reach should be drawn. Not only are different circuits reaching different conclusions
about how broadly Hazelwood should extend, but (as evidenced in the division over
teacher speech) they are not even settled as to which rationales point in which directions.
These developments have significantly complicated the courts’ analysis of whether
Hazelwood permits viewpoint-based speech restrictions, the topic to which I now turn.
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III.

The Split Over Whether Hazelwood Permits Viewpoint-Related Restrictions
While the circuit division over Hazelwood’s reach is significant in its own right,

it takes on added importance when viewed in the context of the circuits’ division over
whether Hazelwood allows viewpoint-related restrictions in addition to content-related
restrictions. The Hazelwood Court never explicitly addressed this question,174 leaving
courts (and commentators) to puzzle over this issue. So far, the Second, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits have concluded that Hazelwood prohibits viewpoint-based restrictions,
while the First and Tenth Circuits have held that it permits them.175
Hazelwood itself provides some evidence for both sides of the debate. As
described above, in section II.A of its analysis, the Court invoked general public forum
principles, stating that
The public schools do not possess all of the attributes of streets, parks, and other
traditional public forums . . . . Hence, school facilities may be deemed to be
public forums only if school authorities have ‘by policy or practice’ opened those
facilities for indiscriminate use by the general public, or by some segment of the
public such as student organizations. If the facilities have been instead been
reserved for other intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, then no public
forum has been created, and school officials may impose reasonable restrictions
on the speech of students, teachers, and other members of the school community.
The government does not create a public forum by inaction or by permitting
limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for
public discourse.176
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The Hazelwood Court went on to conclude that, because the Spectrum was “part of the
educational curriculum and a ‘regular classroom activity’” subject to considerable
oversight by the journalism teacher and ultimately the school principal, it constituted a
nonpublic forum.177 The Court thus concluded, citing its previous seminal decisions in
Perry and Cornelius (which outlined the legal framework for First Amendment cases
involving nonpublic fora) that “school officials were entitled to regulate the contents of
Spectrum in any reasonable manner.”178
What the Hazelwood Court omitted, however, was that Perry and Cornelius had
not only held that restrictions in nonpublic fora had to be reasonable, but had also stated
that such restrictions must be viewpoint-neutral.179 In only discussing the need for
reasonableness, then, the Hazelwood Court left unclear whether the viewpoint neutrality
requirement still applied to the school district’s restrictions on the Spectrum. While
Hazelwood’s invocation of Perry and Cornelius in section II.A arguably points in the
direction of maintaining the viewpoint neutrality requirement, subsequent parts of
Hazelwood – such as its subsequent statement in section II.B that a school must “retain
the authority to refuse to sponsor student speech that might reasonably perceived to
advocate drug or alcohol use, irresponsible sex, or conduct otherwise inconsistent with
‘the shared values of a civilized social order’”180 – point the other way.
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The Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have interpreted Hazelwood as
implicitly maintaining the viewpoint neutrality requirement. “The prohibition against
viewpoint discrimination is firmly embedded in first amendment analysis,” the Eleventh
Circuit reasoned in Searcey, the first circuit court decision addressing this issue.181
“Without more explicit direction, we will continue to require school officials to make
decisions relating to speech that are viewpoint neutral.”182 Similarly, in Planned
Parenthood, the Ninth Circuit simply cited Cornelius and Perry in concluding that
Hazelwood required viewpoint neutrality.183 Most recently, in late 2005, in Peck v.
Baldwinsville Central School District,184 the Second Circuit likewise relied on Cornelius
and Perry in holding that Hazelwood did not permit viewpoint-based restrictions, noting
that Hazelwood had itself made reference to Cornelius and Perry, and stating that “we are
reluctant to conclude that the Supreme Court would, without discussion and indeed
totally sub silentio, overrule Cornelius and Perry – even in the limited context of schoolsponsored student speech.”185
Commentators asserting that Hazelwood should be read as requiring viewpoint
neutrality have generally argued along similar lines. Katie Hammett, for example, argues
that “[g]iven the clear public forum standards developed and the great importance of the
First Amendment protection of free speech, it seems much more likely that if the majority
in Hazelwood meant to create a new category in the public forum and not require
viewpoint-neutrality, as is required in all other categories, the Court would have
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explicitly stated that it was doing so.”186 Denise Daugherty similarly argues that “[i]n the
absence of clear instruction from the Supreme Court to abandon the viewpoint neutral
requirement on restrictions of free speech, the circuit courts should not discard the
requirement on their own.”187
The First and Tenth Circuits, by contrast, have both concluded that Hazelwood
permits viewpoint discrimination. The First Circuit reached that conclusion without
much analysis in Ward, a teacher speech case, simply stating that “while citing Perry,
[Hazelwood] did not require that school regulation of school-sponsored speech be
viewpoint neutral.”188
The Tenth Circuit analyzed the viewpoint discrimination issue in more depth in
Fleming v. Jefferson County School District,189 a case involving tiles that were painted by
students and their families in the aftermath of the April 1999 Columbine High School
massacre. Columbine had implemented a tile-painting project designed to reintroduce
students to the school, but had prohibited tiles that included “religious symbols, the date
of the shooting, or anything obscene or offensive,” and on that basis refused to hang
certain tiles (which included, inter alia, crosses, gang graffiti, the date 4-20, a skull
dripping with blood, and a Jewish star) in school hallways.190 Analyzing the plaintiffs’
claim that the school’s refusal to hang their tiles violated their free speech rights, the
Tenth Circuit concluded that Hazelwood did not require viewpoint neutrality, reasoning
that the “Court’s specific reasons supporting greater control over school-sponsored
speech, such as determining the appropriateness of the message, the sensitivity of the
186
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issue, and with which messages a school chooses to associate itself, often will turn on
viewpoint-based judgments. . . . No doubt the school could promote student speech
advocating against drug use, without being obligated to sponsor speech with the opposing
viewpoint.”191 Janna Annest similarly argues that Hazelwood implies the permissibility
of viewpoint-based restrictions in school-sponsored contexts, arguing that “[i]f the Court
intended to impose standard nonpublic forum strictures on public schools, the principal’s
actions would have been analyzed for evidence of viewpoint-neutrality instead of simply
for reasonableness.”192
Thus, as with the circuit split over Hazelwood’s reach, here too courts and
commentators are divided. But while much attention has been devoted to analyzing each
of these splits as distinct phenomena, there has been very little examination of whether
the two splits are related. In fact, as I argue below, the two splits are connected in an
important way that helps to shed light on both issues.

IV.

The Connective Thread: Linking The Two Splits
How does the circuit split over Hazelwood’s reach connect to the circuit split over

whether Hazelwood permits viewpoint-based restrictions? My thesis is straightforward:
when evaluating whether Hazelwood permits viewpoint discrimination, courts have been
influenced (perhaps without even realizing it) by the context in which they are applying
it. As such, the extension of Hazelwood to contexts beyond school-sponsored student
speech has directly contributed to the confusion and conflict over whether Hazelwood
should be interpreted as permitting viewpoint discrimination.
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Indeed, out of the five circuits that have conclusively reached the Hazelwood
viewpoint discrimination issue, three of them did so in cases that did not even involve
student speech. As noted above, the First Circuit first reached the issue in Ward, which
was a teacher classroom speech case. The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, meanwhile, both
reached the issue in outside entity speech cases (respectively, Planned Parenthood and
Searcey). It is not surprising, therefore, that the First Circuit readily concluded that
Hazelwood permitted viewpoint-based restrictions, while the Ninth and Eleventh Circuit
came down on the other side. The question of whether school districts can implement
restrictions as to the viewpoints that a teacher expresses to her students in the classroom
implicates very different concerns than the question of whether school districts can
maintain viewpoint-based restrictions once they open school-sponsored settings up to
speech by outside entities. In short, once Hazelwood is interpreted as applying to the
speech of students, teachers, and outside entities, it is not possible to reach a uniform,
workable answer to the viewpoint discrimination question.
The notion that a school district cannot impose viewpoint-based restrictions as to
what its teachers say to students in the classroom is deeply problematic. It would
suggest, for instance, that if the curriculum included a unit on slavery, it would violate
teachers’ First Amendment rights to permit them to express anti-slavery views while
prohibiting them from expressing pro-slavery views. Teachers sharing anti-democracy
views with their students in the context of a government class would be similarly
protected.193 While courts would still likely be able to impose certain constraints on
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teacher autonomy – for example, the Establishment Clause would limit teachers’ ability
to engage in religious speech – a ruling that Hazelwood applies to teachers’ in-class
speech and prohibits all viewpoint-based speech restrictions would clearly transfer
tremendous authority from democratically-elected school boards to individual teachers.
Indeed, it would largely undermine school boards’ ability to shape and control what
students in the district were learning in their classrooms.
Once a court concludes that Hazelwood applies to teacher speech, therefore, it is
naturally propelled toward the conclusion that Hazelwood permits viewpoint-based
restrictions, as was the First Circuit in Ward. Conversely, and as discussed in more detail
below, no circuit holding viewpoint discrimination impermissible under Hazelwood has
so held in a case involving the application of Hazelwood to teachers’ classroom speech..
Relatedly, it is noteworthy that other than the First Circuit, the other circuit having
explicitly held viewpoint-related restrictions permissible – the Tenth Circuit – is also one
that, as discussed above, had already been in the forefront of applying Hazelwood to
teachers’ classroom speech and even curricular selection. Had the Tenth Circuit held in
Fleming that viewpoint discrimination was impermissible under Hazelwood, its
precedents, taken together, would have suggested that school officials could not regulate
the viewpoints that teachers communicated to their students in class.
By contrast, of the three circuits concluding that viewpoint discrimination is
impermissible under Hazelwood (the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh), two reached that
conclusion in cases involving the speech of outside entities. As noted above, the Ninth
Circuit decided that Hazelwood forbade viewpoint discrimination when evaluating
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Planned Parenthood’s right to advertise in school publications, and the Eleventh Circuit
reached that conclusion when evaluating peace activists’ right to participate alongside
military recruiters in a high school career fair. Just as it makes sense that the First Circuit
concluded that Hazelwood permitted viewpoint-based restrictions when it viewed the
issue through the lens of teacher speech, so too does it follow that the Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits held that Hazelwood forbade viewpoint-based restrictions when they were
introduced to the question in the context of speech by outside entities. Unlike teachers’
classroom speech – which school districts hire teachers to engage in, and which is at the
very center of schools’ educational and inculcative functions – the speech of outside
entities such as recruiters and advertisers is far more analogous to the speech that
generally triggers basic public forum analysis, under which viewpoint-based restrictions
even in nonpublic fora are unconstitutional.
It is ironic that although Hazelwood was a student speech case, much of the
courts’ analysis over whether it allows viewpoint discrimination has arisen in other
factually distinct contexts. It is also unfortunate. Courts that have broadly extended
Hazelwood to a variety of school-sponsored speech contexts, and are reaching the
Hazelwood viewpoint discrimination issue in whichever context it arises first, run the risk
of unnecessarily boxing themselves in for future cases.
The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have already been faced with this predicament.
The Ninth Circuit confronted it in Downs v. Los Angeles United School District,194 a
2000 case in which a high school teacher who objected to the school’s recognition of
“Gay and Lesbian Awareness Month” created his own bulletin board entitled “Testing
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Tolerance.”195 This bulletin board featured a portion of the Declaration of Independence,
excerpts from newspaper articles (including one indicating that 60% of Americans
considered homosexuality immoral), and a Bible quote condemning homosexuality.196
His bulletin board thus stood as a direct response to the bulletin boards that his colleagues
– whose boards depicted rainbow flags, lists of famous gays and lesbians in history,
articles about domestic partnership benefits, and the like – had created.197 When district
officials ordered the materials removed, the teacher brought a First Amendment claim,
and contended on appeal that even if Hazelwood applied to his speech (as the district
court had held in dismissing his claim), Hazelwood required viewpoint neutrality.198 In
support of this position, the teacher was able to invoke Planned Parenthood, in which the
Ninth Circuit had held that Hazelwood was broadly applicable in school-sponsored
speech contexts and that it forbade viewpoint discrimination.199
The Downs Court thus found itself painted into a corner: it quite evidently felt that
the school district should be permitted to restrict this sort of teacher speech, but the
viewpoint neutrality requirement previously adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Planned
Parenthood made it difficult to reach that outcome. After all, the school was censoring a
bulletin board expressing negative messages about homosexuality while permitting
bulletin boards expressing the contrary viewpoint to remain. The court ended up taking a
circuitous route to arrive at its desired result. It held that the teacher’s speech on the
bulletin board was not in fact teacher speech at all, but rather pure government speech,
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because the principal retained authority over all of the school bulletin boards.200 As such,
the court reasoned, Planned Parenthood and its viewpoint neutrality requirement were
inapplicable.201
This solution, while initially appealing, fails to hold up under examination. The
actual speech in question was not pure government speech: it did not reflect the views of
the school district, and indeed was directed at opposing the school’s decision to recognize
Gay and Lesbian Awareness Month. That the principal retained authority over the
bulletin board upon which the teacher had posted this dissenting speech did not transform
that speech into pure school speech any more than the Hazelwood East High School
principal’s authority to censor the Spectrum rendered that newspaper pure government
speech. Just as the Hazelwood Court deemed the Spectrum “school-sponsored” speech
(rather than pure government speech, a possibility that the Hazelwood Court did not even
consider), so too did the Downs teacher’s speech fall into that category. But because that
conclusion would have forced the Ninth Circuit to apply Planned Parenthood – which it
made clear that it did not want to do202 – it adopted the logically problematic approach of
deeming the teacher’s speech to be government speech and distinguishing Planned
Parenthood on that basis. The constraints that pushed the Downs court toward that
approach are evident, but a more intellectually honest solution would have been to
directly revisit Planned Parenthood’s broad holding that Hazelwood was applicable
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beyond school-sponsored student speech and generally prohibited viewpoint
discrimination.
The Eleventh Circuit found itself similarly constrained when it had to decide
Bannon v. School District of Palm Beach County.203 There, a high school undergoing a
long-term remodeling decided to invite its students to paint murals on the large plywood
panels that appeared throughout the school’s exterior and interior hallways. The only
instruction given to the students was that their artwork “could not be profane or offensive
to anyone.”204 One student proceeded to paint three murals that featured religious
language (such as “God Loves You. What Part of Thou Shalt Not Didn’t You
Understand? God.”) and symbols (such as crucifixes).205 The murals quickly led to
commotion and media attention, and the faculty advisor ordered the student to paint over
the religious portions of her murals.206 The student, in turn, brought a First Amendment
claim, arguing that this amounted to viewpoint discrimination, which the Eleventh Circuit
had already held in Searcey (again, a case involving outside entity speech) was
impermissible under Hazelwood.207
A recent string of Supreme Court cases, culminating in Good News Club v.
Milford Central School,208 supported the student’s argument that the exclusion of her
religiously-themed murals constituted viewpoint discrimination.209 The Bannon majority
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opinion, however, did not even mention Good News. Instead, referring only to the
Supreme Court cases that had preceded Good News (which were less directly on point), it
held rather summarily that “the school did not engage in viewpoint discrimination, but
rather censored the murals on the basis of their content . . . . [t]hese are obviously
inherently religious messages, which cannot be recast as the discussion of secular topics
from a religious perspective.”210 Having essentially assumed away the viewpoint
discrimination issue, the majority then easily held that the restriction satisfied Hazelwood
because it was reasonably related to the legitimate pedagogical concern of reducing the
disruption caused by the murals.211
The Bannon concurrence, by contrast, acknowledged that under the relevant
Supreme Court precedents, the school district’s actions reflected viewpoint
discrimination, which the Eleventh Circuit’s Searcey decision had previously interpreted
Hazelwood as prohibiting.212 The concurrence concluded, however, that Searcey could
be distinguished because Searcey had involved outside entity speech, while this case
involved student speech.213 “Searcey merely stands for the proposition that when a
school has opened itself to outside speakers for some school-sponsored function, such as
career day, it may not discriminate against the outside speakers’ viewpoints,” the
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concurrence argued.214 By contrast, the concurrence continued, Hazelwood could still be
read as permitting viewpoint-based restrictions against school-sponsored student speech,
particularly given the portions of Hazelwood regarding student speech that might be
perceived as advocating drug use, alcohol use, or irresponsible sex.215 The concurrence
thus agreed that the school district’s speech restriction had been permissible, but followed
a different route in getting there.216
Downs and Bannon illustrate the problematic intersection between the broad
extension of Hazelwood and the viewpoint discrimination issue. School-sponsored
speech encompasses a broad range, and the interests implicated by teachers’ classroom
speech, outside entity speech, and student speech are significantly different. A one-sizefits-all approach to all school-sponsored speech, therefore, is destined for failure. The
Bannon concurrence does offer one possible solution to the problem: holding that
Hazelwood’s “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns” standard applies
across-the-board to school-sponsored speech, but interpreting this standard as permitting
viewpoint-based restrictions in some contexts while not in others.
The better approach, however, is to return to Hazelwood’s core as a student
speech case, and to limit its applicability to that setting. Of course, courts often apply
precedents to factually distinct settings – broadening, contracting, and otherwise
modifying them along the way. In Hazelwood’s case, however, this extension into
factually distinct contexts has been ill-advised. A close examination of Hazelwood
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makes clear that it did not simply arise in a student speech context, but that its entire
rationale and approach are uniquely suited to student speech. Furthermore, as discussed
below, other existing legal frameworks are far more appropriate for the other categories
of school-sponsored speech to which Hazelwood has been applied, and there is no reason
to interpret Hazelwood as supplanting those frameworks.
The notion that Hazelwood should apply to all school-sponsored speech seems to
stem from the Hazelwood Court’s initial broad statement that when school facilities have
been reserved for specified intended purposes, “no public forum has been created, and
school officials may impose reasonable restrictions on the speech of students, teachers,
and other members of the school community.”217 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit explicitly
relied on this statement in rejecting Planned Parenthood’s argument that Hazelwood
applied only to student speech.218 This, however, reflects a misreading of Hazelwood.
That initial statement occurred in Section II.A of the opinion, where the Court essentially
summarized its public forum jurisprudence and reiterated the reasonableness test that
applies to nonpublic fora.219 The next part of the opinion – Section II.B – reflects the
Court’s attempt to flesh out what reasonableness meant in the particular context of
school-sponsored student speech, which was the particular issue raised by the facts in
Hazelwood.220 It was specifically in that latter, student-focused portion that the Court
articulated the “reasonable relation to a legitimate pedagogical concern” standard.221
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In addition to the distinct section headings, two other pieces of textual evidence
indicate that this standard was formulated specifically for the student speech context.
First, almost every sentence in this portion of the discussion refers explicitly to “student
expression” or “student speech” – including, most importantly, the very sentence setting
forth the “reasonable relation to a legitimate pedagogical concern” standard.222 Second,
several of the interests that the Hazelwood Court identified as giving rise to legitimate
pedagogical concerns indicate that the Hazelwood Court largely had student speech in
mind. Although some of the interests mentioned by the Court are equally applicable to
speakers and listeners (such as restricting speech that is biased, prejudiced, vulgar,
profane, or inappropriate for the students’ level of maturity), others bespeak a particular
emphasis on teaching the speaker a lesson.223
For example, one pedagogical interest cited by the Hazelwood Court was a
school’s need to ensure that participants in school-sponsored activities “learn whatever
lessons the activity is designed to teach,” along with its related need to disapprove of
“ungrammatical, poorly written, [or] inadequately researched” speech.224 Indeed, the
Court later found that the Hazelwood East principal’s censorship had been reasonable
precisely because he could have concluded that the students writing these articles had
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In the very first sentence of Section II.B, the Court framed the question as “whether the First
Amendment requires a school affirmatively to promote particular student speech.” Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at
270. It went on to state that “educators are entitled to exercise greater control over this . . . form of student
expression,” that “[a] school must be able to set high standards for the student speech that is disseminated
under its auspices . . . and may refuse to disseminate student speech that does not meet those standards,”
that “a school must be able to take into account the emotional maturity of the intended audience in
determining whether to disseminate student speech on potentially sensitive topics,” that “a school must also
retain the authority to refuse to sponsor student speech that might reasonably be perceived to advocate drug
or alcohol use,” and, finally, that “educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial
control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as
their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” Id. at 271-73.
223
See Buss, School Newspapers, supra note 9, at 520-21 (noting that “the Court in Hazelwood was not very
clear in delineating whether Spectrum was a curricular device for teaching its readers or its writers”).
224
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271-72.

50

failed to master relevant portions of the Journalism II curriculum.225 This rationale
makes sense only in the context of student speech. As Karen Daly writes, “school
administrators . . . have no stake in ensuring teachers learn whatever lessons the activity
is . . . designed to teach.”226 The same is, of course, true for outside entities. By the same
token, school officials have no real interest in improving the research and writing skills of
teachers or outside entities; here, too, a legitimate pedagogical concern arises only if the
speaker is a student.
Similarly, the Hazelwood Court also identified the interest that schools have in
“awakening . . . child[ren] to cultural values” and “preparing them for professional
training,” and explained that in order to fulfill this role, schools must retain the authority
to restrict “student speech that might reasonably be perceived to advocate conduct . . .
inconsistent with the shared values of a civilized social order.”227 Here, too, the Court
appears to have been particularly concerned with teaching student speakers a lesson –
namely, how to conduct themselves appropriately in public settings so that they would be
prepared for successful and productive adult lives.
The broad spirit of Hazelwood, in addition to its text, also counsels its limitation
to the student speech setting. The Tinker/Hazelwood division of the student speech
universe – whereby students have quite broad freedom to express their personal views on
school premises, but are subject to greater oversight when they do so within the context
of school-sponsored activities – strikes a balance reflecting the unique relationship
between students and their schools. On the one hand, school serves as a microcosm of
society for K-12 students. School is their primary opportunity to meet and communicate
225
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with each other, and it is there that they take on positions of leadership among their peer
community in formal and informal ways. Indeed, as Tinker itself noted, among the
activities to which schools are dedicated is “personal intercommunication among the
students.”228 At the same time, school is a crucial societal mechanism for educating and
inculcating them in cultural values and mores. The Tinker/Hazelwood regime responds
to that duality by roughly aligning the degree of school authority over student speech
with the level of school sponsorship (and thus apparent approval) of that speech.229
Neither teachers nor outside entities stand in that same relationship toward
schools, and other legal doctrines provide better frameworks for assessing the
constitutionality of school restrictions as to their speech. The relationship between
schools and teachers is, at bottom, an employer/employee relationship. As W. Stuart
Stuller writes, “[t]eaching is an occupation effected through speech.”230 Teachers speak
to students in the classroom because that is what they are hired and paid to do, and such
in-class speech occurs in their role as adult authority figures. When schools impose
restrictions as to teachers’ classroom speech, those restrictions are not there to achieve
the Hazelwood interests of improving their grammar, instructing them in social norms, or
preparing them for successful careers. Rather, such restrictions – regardless of whether
they are well- or ill-advised in particular cases – reflect a supervisory attempt to control
how teachers are performing their job of conveying information to students.
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It follows that the Pickering framework, as further refined by Connick and
Garcetti, that generally covers public employees provides the best fit for assessing school
districts’ restrictions on the classroom speech of public school teachers. It is already well
established that this framework applies to teacher speech outside of the classroom. As
described above, Pickering itself involved a public school teacher’s letter to the editor,
and several other Supreme Court cases have also applied Pickering to the speech of
public school teachers. Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District,231 for
example, involved a teacher’s complaint to the principal about the school’s racially
discriminatory practices,232 and Mt. Healthy City School District v. Doyle233 involved a
teacher’s call to a local radio station.234
The courts deeming Hazelwood rather than Pickering applicable to teachers’ inclass speech have nonetheless concluded (either explicitly or implicitly) that the
classroom context somehow renders Pickering inapplicable.235 The Fourth Circuit’s
initial Boring opinion, for example, stated that the Pickering-Connick “‘public concern’
analysis simply does not provide a very useful tool when analyzing a teacher’s classroom
speech [because] the essence of a teacher’s role in the classroom, and therefore as an
employee, is to discuss with students issues of public concern.”236 Several commentators
similarly argue that the classroom environment is so unique that Pickering cannot apply
to teacher speech that occurs within it. Karen Daly, for instance, writes that the “the
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Pickering line of cases fails to account for the unique job requirements of public school
teachers,” who “are expected to engage in semi-public speech on a variety of topics.”237
Gregory Clarick likewise argues that “the distinction between speech related to issues of
public concern and speech internal to an employee’s workplace does not take into
account the function and unique atmosphere of teaching.”238
Given that the entire Pickering-Connick framework centers on a threshold
assessment of the capacity in which the public employee has spoken, however, it is
difficult to see why it cannot encompass the classroom speech context. The fact that a
public school teacher’s speech has been uttered in the classroom to students – rather than
to a radio station, newspaper, or principal – may ultimately lead to a different outcome
under Pickering. But that should not utterly remove the case from Pickering’s domain.
The Supreme Court’s 2006 Garcetti decision confirms this view. There, a deputy
district attorney brought a First Amendment claim after being retaliated against for
writing a memo to his supervisors in which he concluded that an affidavit used to obtain a
search warrant had contained serious misrepresentations, and that the resulting criminal
case should therefore be dismissed.239 Garcetti thus required the Court to clarify an
important question about the public employee framework that had been developed in
Pickering and Connick. As described above, the threshold inquiry under that framework
is whether the employee was speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern. Here,
the plaintiff did not dispute that he had prepared the memo pursuant to his employment
duties as a prosecutor, but argued that his speech nonetheless satisfied the threshold
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because it related to a matter of public concern (governmental misconduct).240 The
Supreme Court, however, held that his speech did not meet the threshold, emphasizing
that the central inquiry under Pickering-Connick was whether the speech had been uttered
in the plaintiff’s capacity as an employee. The Court wrote:
We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official
duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes,
and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer
discipline. . . . When he went to work and performed the tasks he was paid to
perform, Ceballos acted as a government employee. The fact that his duties
sometimes required him to speak or write does not mean his supervisors were
prohibited from evaluating his performance.241
Garcetti, despite its occurrence outside of the public school context, is instructive.
The deputy district attorney’s memo was essentially a hybrid of employee speech and
speech on a matter of public concern – the same characteristic of teachers’ classroom
speech that some courts and commentators have identified as making Pickering useless.
But the Garcetti Court did not hesitate to apply the Pickering-Connick framework to the
deputy district attorney’s speech. Indeed, no part of the opinion – including the dissents
– even suggested that the hybrid nature of this speech somehow rendered Pickering
altogether inapplicable. Their only disagreement related to the case’s outcome under
Pickering. This calls into question any notion that Pickering is not also capacious
enough to include teachers’ classroom speech. Indeed, as described above, in the first
post-Garcetti circuit court case involving a teacher’s classroom speech – Mayer v.
Monroe County Community School Corporation242 — the Seventh Circuit applied
Pickering (as refined by Garcetti) without even acknowledging its previous invocation of
Hazelwood.
240
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Of course, Garcetti also suggests that public school teachers’ classroom speech
would likely not get past the threshold for First Amendment protection. Just like the
deputy district attorney in Garcetti, when public school teachers speak in the classroom,
they are acting as government employees, regardless of whether that speech also happens
to touch on a matter of public concern. Indeed, in his dissent, Justice Souter flagged this
very issue. He noted that the Garcetti majority’s interpretation of Pickering was
“spacious enough to include even the teaching of a public university professor,” adding
that “I have to hope that today’s majority does not mean to imperil First Amendment
protection of academic freedom in public colleges and universities, whose teachers
necessarily speak and write ‘pursuant to official duties.’”243 The majority, in turn,
explicitly responded that “Justice Souter suggests today’s decision may have important
ramifications for academic freedom, at least as a constitutional value. There is some
argument that expression related to academic freedom or classroom instruction implicates
additional constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court’s
customary employee-speech jurisprudence. We need not, and for that reason do not,
decide whether the analysis we conduct today would apply in the same manner in a case
involving speech related to scholarship or teaching.”244
It is true that the Garcetti majority’s language (unlike Justice Souter’s dissent)
referred generally to “academic freedom,” and did not explicitly limit itself to speech by
public college and university professors. It seems unlikely, however, that the majority
intended to carve out a broader swath than Justice Souter had himself identified as being
in jeopardy. Not only was the majority responding directly to Justice Souter, but the
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concept of academic freedom is far more established at the university level than at the K12 public school level, where school boards bear ultimate responsibility for curricular and
policy decisions. As the Seventh Circuit concluded in Mayer:
K-12 public “[e]ducation is compulsory, and children must attend public schools
unless their parents are willing to incur the cost of private education or the
considerable time commitment of home schooling. Children who attend school
because they must ought not be subject to teachers’ idiosyncratic perspectives.
Majority rule about what subjects and viewpoints will be expressed in the
classroom has the potential to turn into indoctrination . . . But if indoctrination is
likely, the power should be reposed in someone the people can vote out of office,
rather than tenured teachers. At least the board’s views can be debated openly,
and the people may choose to elect persons committed to neutrality on
contentious issues.245
That said, it remains to be seen how the Supreme Court will ultimately apply the
Pickering-Connick-Garcetti framework to the professorial context, and it is at least
plausible that the Court will do so in a way that provides some constitutional protection
for the classroom speech of K-12 public school teachers. My purpose is not to speculate
about whether and how this might occur, but simply to emphasize that any First
Amendment protection for teachers’ classroom speech should stem from that public
employment-based framework, rather than from Hazelwood.246 Trying to fit the square
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peg of teacher classroom speech into the round hole of Hazelwood ends up distorting
Hazelwood itself, undermining Hazelwood’s utility in the student speech context for
which it was actually designed.
Hazelwood should similarly be inapplicable to restrictions on the speech of
outside entities in school-sponsored settings. As described above, Hazelwood’s analysis
proceeds in two parts: Section II.A summarizes the Court’s general public forum
doctrine, with repeated reference to Perry and Cornelius; and Section II.B fleshes out
what “reasonableness” means in the specific context of school-sponsored student speech
(implying, in the process, the permissibility of certain viewpoint-based restrictions, as
discussed above and as discussed further below). When the speaker is an outside entity
rather than a student, there is no need to proceed to Section II.B, which was formulated
specifically for student speech. Rather, general public forum doctrine should be applied.
The courts that have applied Hazelwood to outside entity speech have, in practice,
actually ended up doing this. But rather than doing so by deeming Hazelwood
inapplicable outside of the student context, as I urge, they have done so by interpreting

See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599-603 (1972). See also Buss, Academic Freedom, supra note 9,
at 262-274 (arguing that outside of the First Amendment, notions of implied contractual terms, procedural
due process, and substantive due process all provide protection for teachers’ classroom speech, particularly
where they have not received adequate notice that the speech in question was prohibited). Karen Daly, as
discussed above, also argues that the presence or absence of notice should determine the level of protection
accorded teachers’ classroom speech.
Additionally, a school district obviously remains free to provide its teachers with additional
protection for their classroom speech. See, e.g., N. La. Board Policy “Next Wave of Attack by AntiEvolution Forces,” THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 14, 2006 (describing one northern Louisiana parish’s new
policy regarding the teaching of science, which stated that the district “understands that the teaching of
some scientific subjects such as biological evolution, the chemical origins of life, global warming and
human cloning, can cause controversy and that some teachers may be unsure of the district’s expectations
concerning how they should present information on such subjects” and that “teachers shall be permitted to
help students understand, analyze, critique and review in an objective manner the scientific strengths and
weaknesses of existing scientific theories pertinent to the course being taught.” Assuming arguendo that
this policy would pass muster under the Establishment Clause, it would arguably provide additional
security to teachers (such as the plaintiff teacher in Webster v. New Lenox School Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d
1004 (7th Cir. 1990)) who chose to discuss creationism in the classroom.

58

Hazelwood in a way that makes it functionally indistinguishable from basic public forum
analysis. In Searcey, for example, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the Career Day at
issue was a nonpublic forum, that speech restrictions as to the speakers must therefore be
reasonable and viewpoint neutral, and that certain restrictions passed that test while
others did not.247 The only role that Hazelwood played in the discussion, therefore, was
in the court’s rejection of the school district’s argument that Hazelwood had eliminated
the viewpoint neutrality requirement.248 Indeed, the Searcey court specifically stated that
Hazelwood “does not alter the test for reasonableness in a nonpublic forum such as a
school but rather provides the context in which the reasonableness of regulations should
be considered.”249 The Searcey court would thus have reached the identical result had it
held Hazelwood altogether inapplicable.
Similarly, in Planned Parenthood, the Ninth Circuit ruled the yearbook in
question a nonpublic forum, interpreted Hazelwood as maintaining the viewpoint
neutrality requirement, and then assessed the speech restriction to determine whether it
had been reasonable and viewpoint neutral.250 Again, the result would have been
identical had the Ninth Circuit simply deemed Hazelwood inapplicable to the speech of
outside entities. Indeed, once Hazelwood is interpreted as containing a viewpoint
neutrality requirement, it becomes identical to the general approach to a nonpublic forum.
The viewpoint neutrality requirement is the same, and Hazelwood’s “reasonable relation
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to a legitimate pedagogical purpose” standard simply becomes one way of phrasing the
general reasonableness requirement for nonpublic fora.251
General public forum doctrine also provides schools with the flexibility that they
need to restrict inappropriate outside entity speech in school-sponsored settings. As an
initial matter, schools are not required to open their doors to outside entities in the first
place. While the presence of students and teachers in schools is a given, the presence of
outside entities is not. Once a school decides to open its doors to outside entities –
whether, for example, by making its facilities generally available after school, holding a
career forum, selling ads in its yearbook, or providing outside entities with access to its
distribution systems – it can set the terms for that access. It can create a limited public
forum, in which all individuals who wish to speak about a topic that falls within the
forum’s boundaries are presumptively entitled to access. Or it can create a nonpublic
forum in which each speaker must individually obtain permission before participating, in
which case restrictions as to particular speakers will be permissible as long as they are
reasonable and viewpoint-neutral. Alternatively, if the school is simply bringing in a
particular outside speaker to serve as its own agent in conveying a particular message to
students (for example, an outside health educator to speak about the dangers of drug use
or unsafe sex), then no forum at all has been created, and no other outside entities will be
able to claim a First Amendment right of access.252
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Applying Hazelwood to outside entity speech, and stretching it to mirror general
public forum doctrine in the process, is therefore both unnecessary and unwise. It is
unnecessary because general public forum doctrine can do the job on its own, and
Hazelwood should not be interpreted as supplanting it outside of the student speech
context. And it is unwise because, as Downs and particularly Bannon illustrate, it leads
to precedents that end up complicating subsequent applications of Hazelwood to student
speech.
Finally, as to textbook and curricular selections, the Third, Fifth, and Seventh
Circuits have persuasively explained, in Edwards, Chiras, and Mayer respectively, why
these reflect school district-level decisions and thus amount to pure government speech.
As such, here tooHazelwood is inapplicable. Hazelwood’s reach should therefore be
narrowed back to the context in which it first arose: school-sponsored student speech.

V.

My Proposal: A Sliding-Scale Approach for Student Speech
The extension of Hazelwood to a broad range of speech contexts has not only

unnecessarily complicated the viewpoint discrimination analysis. It has also rendered it
increasingly abstract, with courts largely treating it as a simple “yes or no” question.
Returning to Hazelwood’s core as a student speech case, in turn, helps to sharpen the
analysis of this issue.
It seems relatively clear that Hazelwood contemplated the permissibility of
viewpoint-based restrictions as to school-sponsored student speech in at least some
circumstances. As described above, the Hazelwood Court stated that public schools must

the only speakers on government property, then “there is no actionable viewpoint discrimination, because
there is no discrimination “).
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“retain the authority to refuse to sponsor student speech that might reasonably be
perceived to advocate drug or alcohol use, irresponsible sex, or conduct otherwise
inconsistent with the shared values of a civilized order,”253 and that schools may also
dissociate themselves from speech that is “biased or prejudiced.”254 The Court went on
to argue that if Tinker – as opposed to its newly-announced standard – applied to school
newspapers, schools would be faced with including in their newspapers “all student
expression that does not threaten ‘material disruption of classwork or violation of ‘rights
that are protected by law,’ regardless of how sexually explicit, racially intemperate, or
personally insulting that expression otherwise might be.”255 And it predicted that in order
to prevent that from occurring, many schools would go so far as to dissolve their student
newspapers altogether.256
These statements strongly point toward the permissibility of viewpoint-based
restrictions in some circumstances. After all, if Hazelwood does not allow viewpointbased restrictions, it is difficult to see how it achieves the Hazelwood Court’s expressed
goal of providing schools with additional discretion – beyond what they already possess
under Tinker – to censor, in school-sponsored settings, student speech that expresses, e.g.,
pro-drug, pro-drinking, or “racially intemperate” views. Hazelwood’s omission of any
viewpoint neutrality requirement further points in this direction. Indeed, Susannah
Barton Tobin – while opposing viewpoint-based restrictions and urging the Court to
revisit this issue – concedes that “evidence indicates that the 1988 [Hazelwood] Court
might have intended to abandon the viewpoint neutrality requirement for school
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speech.”257 Interestingly, Tobin reports that when she interviewed one of the Hazelwood
students’ attorneys about the case, he described himself as “somewhat astonished to learn
that some courts have construed the case as prohibiting, or at least not authorizing,
censorship based on the speaker’s views,” reflecting that “I always thought that it quite
clearly did sanction viewpoint discrimination.”258
But concluding that Hazelwood permits viewpoint discrimination as to some
school-sponsored student speech should only be the start of the analysis. The more
challenging issue – and the one that remains relatively unexplored – is when such
viewpoint-based restrictions should be allowed under Hazelwood. In other words, given
the general suspicion of viewpoint-based restrictions, when will a school’s viewpointbased restriction sufficiently relate to legitimate pedagogical concerns? This question
can best be answered through a sliding-scale approach that incorporates the two core
aspects of Hazelwood: (1) the initial trigger for Hazelwood’s applicability, i.e., the
occurrence of the speech in a school-sponsored activity that “students, parents, and
members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school”;
and (2) the ultimate standard once Hazelwood applies, i.e., that the speech restriction be
“reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” As described below, the
stronger the perception of school imprimatur over the student speech at issue, the more
latitude the school should receive to restrict it by means of viewpoint-based
restrictions.259
257
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The trigger for Hazelwood’s applicability is a relatively low one. Hazelwood
encompasses students’ speech in the classroom,260 in their written assignments,261 in
school publications, 262 in school assemblies,263 in school productions,264 in artwork that
temporarily or permanently decorates the school halls, 265 and in any other activity that is
supervised by faculty members, designed to impart knowledge or skills to student
participants, and could be perceived by others as bearing the school’s imprimatur. Given
this relatively wide range, not all Hazelwood-qualifying student speech is going to be
equally suggestive of school imprimatur. Generally speaking, the perception of
imprimatur will be at its highest in two situations: where the student speech is changing
the permanent physical appearance of the school itself; or where the student speech is
substantively changing the nature of other students’ classroom experience. In such
instances, the student expression comes relatively close to functioning as the school’s
own speech, particularly in terms of its practical effect. Here, school officials should
receive broad latitude to restrict student speech, even if their restrictions are viewpoint-
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related. By contrast, where the speech is clearly attributable to a particular student and is
altering neither the school’s permanent physical appearance nor other students’ classroom
experience, the perception that the school affirmatively approves of the student speech –
as opposed to simply permitting its dissemination – is likely to be lower. This latter
category will typically include student speech that is delivered at a school assembly,
printed in a school publication, or submitted in response to a particular class assignment.
Here, Hazelwood’s standard should be applied more stringently, with school speech
restrictions that involve viewpoint discrimination being subjected to examination more
akin to intermediate scrutiny than to rational basis review.
This distinction is nicely illustrated by the Third Circuit case of C.H. v. Oliva,266
which involved two instances of school-sponsored student speech falling on different
places along the “imprimatur spectrum.” The first instance occurred when the plaintiff
child was in kindergarten. His kindergarten teacher, in connection with Thanksgiving,
asked the students in the class to make posters depicting what they were thankful for.267
The plaintiff created a poster indicating that he was thankful for Jesus.268 His poster was
hung in the hallway along with the other posters produced by students in the plaintiff’s
class, but it was subsequently removed and then placed in a less prominent location.269
The second instance occurred approximately eighteen months later, when, as part of the
reading instructional program, the plaintiff’s first-grade teacher invited students to bring
in a book from home and read one of their favorite stories to the entire class.270 The
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plaintiff brought in “The Beginner’s Bible” and sought to read a Bible story to his
classmates.271 The teacher did not allow him to read the story to his classmates because
of its religious content, and instead had him read it to her in private.272
The first-grade Bible story incident is a good example of school-sponsored
student speech that is likely to produce a strong perception of school imprimatur. The
classroom is at the center of a school’s pedagogical mission, and schools should have
significant discretion over what is taught there. This was not a situation where the
student simply would have been expressing his own views in response to a question or
class assignment. Rather, the student, in reading a Bible story to his classmates as part of
a classroom lesson, would have been changing the very nature of that lesson and
affecting his fellow students’ classroom experience. As the Third Circuit stated in its
initial opinion on the case:
[T]he classroom setting involve[s] a religiously heterogeneous and captive
audience. It is not unreasonable to expect that parents of non-Christian children
would resent exposure of their six-year-old children to a reading from the Bible.
Nor is it unreasonable to expect that some parents of Christian first graders would
regard a compelled classroom exposure to material from the Bible as an
infringement of their parental right to guide the religious development of their
children at this stage. Moreover, it is not unreasonable to expect that any
resentment engendered by [the plaintiff’s] reading would have a significant
adverse impact on the important relationship between the parents, the teacher, and
their school.273
Indeed, given that other students would have been compelled to listen to the Bible story,
it is even possible that had the school permitted the Bible reading to go forward, it would
have faced claims of an Establishment Clause violation by other parents.
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But a school should not have to show that speech will cause an Establishment
Clause violation in order to justify its decision to exclude it from a classroom lesson.
When it comes to the substance of classroom lessons, which are at the core of a school’s
educational mission, school officials should retain broad discretion to restrict student
speech for any legitimate pedagogical purpose – including the avoidance of potential
disruption or discomfort by other students and their parents – even if doing so entails a
viewpoint-based restriction. Of course, schools should not have entirely free rein to
restrict student speech in the classroom setting. A restriction that is truly unrelated to any
legitimate pedagogical purpose (for example, a classroom election-day activity in which
students can only speak in favor of candidates from one party) should be held
unconstitutional. Provided that the school can articulate a genuine pedagogical
justification for its restriction, however, the restriction should pass constitutional scrutiny
regardless of whether it is viewpoint-related.
A similar high-imprimatur situation was presented in Walz v. Egg Harbor
Township Board of Education,274 in which a first-grader sought to pass out candy canes
bearing religious messages (which explained that the candy cane represented Jesus, “who
came to earth as our Savior”) to his fellow students during an in-class seasonal holiday
party.275 The pedagogical purpose of the party, according to the school, was “to teach
social skills and respect for others in a festive setting.”276 The school, having prohibited
students from bringing in any gifts with commercial, political, or religious messages, did
not permit the student to distribute the candy canes at the party, although it did allow him
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to do so at recess and after school.277 The court upheld the constitutionality of the
school’s actions, explaining that “[the student] was not attempting exercise a right to
personal religious observance in response to a class assignment or activity. His mother’s
stated purpose was to promote a religious message through the channel of a benign
classroom activity.”278 Again, had the student been permitted to engage in the speech in
question, the very substance of the classroom activity would have changed. The school’s
determination that it wanted to maintain the secular nature of this activity warranted great
deference.
Other cases falling at the high end of the imprimatur spectrum include Fleming v.
Jefferson County School District279 and Bannon v. School District of Palm Beach
County,280 in which the speech at issue would have changed the permanent physical
appearance of the school. In Fleming, as discussed above,281 the tiles in question were to
be installed throughout the schools of Columbine High School, becoming a permanent
part of the school’s interior. Similarly, in Bannon, the religiously-themed murals were to
remain in the school’s exterior and interior hallways throughout the duration of the
school’s long-term remodeling project, which was to last up to four years.282 In both
cases, therefore, the speech in question was going to transform the appearance of the
school itself in a relatively permanent fashion, lasting long after the creator of that speech
was gone. The Fleming Court itself emphasized this aspect, stating that “expressive
activities that the school allows to be integrated permanently into the school environment
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and that students pass by during the school day come much closer to reasonably bearing
the imprimatur of the school.”283 The same is essentially true of Bannon. In these cases,
therefore, the schools were properly granted broad discretion to restrict the speech at
issue, even though some of their restrictions were viewpoint-based. Like classroom
lessons, the permanent physical appearance of the school is almost inseparable from the
school itself. A reasonable observer is likely to perceive speech permanently etched on
school walls as the school’s own, or, at the very least, as strongly indicative of the
school’s own views.
The kindergarten incident in Oliva, by contrast, provides a good example of
student speech that, despite occurring in a school-sponsored context, was not strongly
suggestive of school imprimatur. The student’s poster was going to be temporarily hung
in a school hallway alongside numerous other posters responding to the same
Thanksgiving assignment. The poster was clearly attributable to one particular student,
was presumably going to be removed relatively soon after the Thanksgiving holiday, and
was not affecting the substance of any classroom lesson or activity. In fact, then-Judge
Alito – in dissenting from the Third Circuit’s en banc dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim as
to his poster – argued that the poster should not even be considered Hazelwoodqualifying speech, asserting that “[t]hings that students express in class or in assignments
when called upon to express their own views do not bear the imprimatur of the school
and do not represent the school’s own speech” and that “reasonable students, parents, and
members of the public would not have perceived [the plaintiff’s] poster as bearing the
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imprimatur of the school or as an expression of the school’s own viewpoint.”284 This is
an aggressive interpretation of Hazelwood, which expressly stated that it covered all
activities that were part of the school curriculum. But Judge Alito’s larger point – that
speech contained in one student’s response to a school assignment is unlikely to yield a
strong perception of school imprimatur – is well-taken.
A strikingly similar situation arose in Peck v. Baldwinsville Central School
District,285 in which a kindergartner, in response to an assignment to create a poster
illustrating ways to help the environment, drew a poster that included depictions of
children recycling, trees, grass, and a “robed, praying figure” intended to be Jesus.286 His
teacher, when hanging all of the students’ posters for an environmental assembly, folded
the plaintiff student’s poster in half so that the portion depicting Jesus was concealed. 287
The Second Circuit held that the student’s resulting First Amendment claim could go
forward, ruling (as noted above288) that Hazelwood generally prohibited viewpoint
discrimination.289 Here, too, the perception of school imprimatur in regard to the
student’s poster was low, given that the poster was hung alongside numerous other
posters for a limited duration and was clearly attributable to one particular student. It is
unlikely that any observer, viewing the student’s poster in the context of the posters
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created by the entire class, would have believed that the school itself agreed with or had
communicated the view that Jesus was a way to save the environment.
Student speech at assemblies or publications will also typically yield a relatively
weak perception of school imprimatur. In Poling v. Murphy,290 for instance, the plaintiff
student’s campaign speech for student council president – in which he stated: “[t]he
administration plays tricks with your mind and they hope you won’t notice. For example,
why does [the assistant principal] stutter when he is on the intercom? He doesn’t have a
speech impediment. If you want to break the iron grip of this school, vote for me for
president.”291 – was one of numerous speeches delivered by various student candidates
during a school assembly. There is no question that the assembly, which was overseen
by a faculty advisor to the student council and which all students were required to
attend,292 fell within Hazelwood’s broad umbrella. But it is less likely that the student
body actually perceived school officials as necessarily agreeing with all of the views
espoused by the different candidates. Rather, any perception of school imprimatur was
likely limited to an impression that the school had permitted its students to make these
speeches as part of the self-government opportunities offered to them, and that school
officials did not deem the speeches so inappropriate as to warrant exclusion. Studentauthored editorials and articles in school newspapers, magazines, yearbooks, and other
publications are similarly unlikely to yield a particularly strong impression of school
imprimatur. The very existence of the student author’s by-line implies some level of
distinction between the school’s own views and the views of that student.
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This is not to say that schools should not have considerable power to restrict
student speech in school-sponsored contexts that fall on the low end of the “imprimatur
spectrum,” i.e., student speech that just satisfies the Hazelwood threshold. Hazelwood,
itself a school newspaper case, clearly establishes this authority. It does, however, mean
that when school restrictions as to such speech are viewpoint-based, those restrictions
should at least be subject to some real scrutiny, given the general suspicion of viewpoint
discrimination and the failure of Hazelwood to speak explicitly to this issue. Indeed,
although Hazelwood can be seen as generally providing for deferential “rational basis”
review,293 this is the sub-category of Hazelwood cases in which review more akin to
intermediate scrutiny is appropriate. Rather than being required to show merely a
reasonable relationship to a legitimate pedagogical concern, a school imposing a
viewpoint-based restriction as to student speech in a context yielding only a weak
perception of school imprimatur should have to show that the restriction is substantially
related to an important pedagogical purpose – that is, that there is an exceedingly
persuasive justification for the restriction.294
This sliding-scale approach, whereby the level of scrutiny of viewpoint-based
restrictions would be inversely related to the level of school imprimatur, would have two
speech-protective results. First, in low-imprimatur settings triggering intermediate
scrutiny, a school would not be able to impose a viewpoint-based restriction without
connecting it to an important pedagogical concern. Not all of the pedagogical concerns
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that Hazelwood identified as “legitimate” would necessarily rise to this level, particularly
given that this more stringent standard would only apply to student speech cases at the
low end of the imprimatur spectrum. For example, Hazelwood listed, as two of its
legitimate pedagogical concerns, “assur[ing] that . . . . the views of the individual speaker
are not erroneously attributed to the school” and preserving a school’s “authority to
refuse to sponsor student speech that might reasonably be perceived to . . . associate the
school with any position other than neutrality on matters of political controversy.”295 But
once the speech in question has already been found to yield only a weak perception of
school sponsorship, it is unlikely that this type of concern will be sufficiently important
to justify a viewpoint-based restriction. Similarly, if the school’s proffered pedagogical
interest in imposing the viewpoint-based restriction is the avoidance of potential
disruption, the school should be required to show a significant likelihood that disruption
will result from dissemination of the student’s speech in order to establish an important
pedagogical concern.
Second, in such low-imprimatur settings, the school would also have to
demonstrate a substantial – not just a “reasonable” – relationship between the viewpointbased nature of the restriction and the important pedagogical concern. This differs from
Hazelwood’s suggestion that generally, the particular method by which the school official
restricts the student speech need not be closely scrutinized. That message was
communicated by the Hazelwood Court’s apparent lack of concern over the principal’s
harsh method of censoring the two articles in question – i.e., pulling two entire pages
(which also included other articles) out of the newspaper, rather than deleting only the
two articles in question or giving the student authors the opportunity to make changes.
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Acknowledging that the principal had not looked into whether these more limited
alternative options were feasible, the Court simply noted that the principal’s actions were
“reasonable under the circumstances as he understood them.”296 Even assuming
arguendo that those actions were reasonable for purposes of a rational basis review, it is
unlikely that they would satisfy intermediate scrutiny, given that the principal’s
pedagogical concerns could have been readily satisfied by the alternative means
described above. Only where the important pedagogical concern cannot be effectively
achieved through a viewpoint-neutral approach should the school officials be deemed as
having proffered an exceedingly persuasive justification for their viewpoint-based
restriction. Thus, a viewpoint-based restriction motivated solely by the school’s desire to
avoid being associated with a controversial position would presumably fail not only
because this is unlikely to be an important pedagogical concern in the first place (given
the low perception of school imprimatur), but also because other methods – such as
prominent disclaimers — could achieve the same goal without suppressing the student
speaker’s views. More broadly, before imposing a viewpoint-based restriction on a
student’s speech, school officials would need to communicate with the student to
determine whether there were any non-viewpoint-based approaches through which the
school’s concerns about the student expression could be alleviated.
The notion of using a sliding-scale approach to assess restrictions on schoolsponsored student speech accords with Supreme Court precedent on both the school and
speech fronts. Indeed, in several other contexts involving public school students’
constitutional rights, the Supreme Court has already turned to sliding-scale frameworks
as the best way of balancing students’ rights against schools’ educational and safety
296
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needs. With regard to students’ Fourth Amendment rights in the context of random drug
testing, for example, the Court held in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton297 that the
constitutionality of such testing depends upon a fact-specific weighing of the nature and
the immediacy of the school’s interest in conducting the testing against the nature of the
students’ privacy interest and the character of the intrusion.298 Similarly, as to students’
Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights in the context of school discipline,
the Court indicated in Goss v. Lopez299 that the level of process that is due depends on the
extent of the discipline imposed, holding that suspensions of ten days or less require
some type of “notice and informal hearing,” while “longer suspensions and expulsions
for the remainder of the school term, or permanently, may require more formal
procedures.”300
Meanwhile, on the speech front, the Pickering-Connick framework itself involves
a sliding-scale analysis at the second prong of the analysis. As described above, once a
court has concluded that the First Amendment threshold is satisfied – i.e., that the
plaintiff employee was speaking about a matter of public concern in his capacity as a
citizen – it then proceeds to a balancing test in which the employer’s interest in regulating
the speech is weighed against the employee’s First Amendment interest in uttering it.
The Connick Court was explicit about the sliding-scale nature of this approach, stating
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that “a stronger showing may be necessary if the employee’s speech more substantially
involved matters of public concern.”301 Acknowledging that “such particularized
balancing is difficult,” the Court emphasized that “the court must reach the most
appropriate possible balance of the competing interests.”302
Just as the Supreme Court has recognized the appropriateness of sliding-scale
approaches as to other constitutional issues involving both schools and speech, so too
does this article’s proposed sliding-scale approach provide a helpful way of analyzing the
difficult questions raised by viewpoint-based restrictions of student speech in schoolsponsored settings. Indeed, returning to some of the cases discussed above usefully
illustrates how this article’s proposed approach would play out in practice.
The key points of departure between the actual resolution of these cases and the
proposed approach’s resolution of these cases can be seen in Oliva, Peck, and Poling. In
Oliva, the initial three-judge panel of the Third Circuit applied the same level of scrutiny
to both the kindergarten Thanksgiving poster depicting Jesus and the first-grade Bible
story incident, and upheld the constitutionality of both restrictions on that basis.303 My
sliding-scale approach, by contrast, would require viewpoint-based restrictions as to the
Thanksgiving poster to satisfy intermediate scrutiny, given the low perception of
imprimatur there. It is unlikely that they could have passed this test. None of the
“legitimate pedagogical concerns” identified by the Oliva panel with regard to removal
and relocation of the poster – “the sensitivity of the issues raised by student religious
expression, coupled with the notable immaturity of the students involved and the
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relatively public display of the posters in the school hallway”304 – is particularly strong.
No evidence was cited that the poster interfered with any classroom lessons, caused any
(let alone significant) disruption in the hallways, or placed the school in violation of the
Establishment Clause. Thus, this article’s proposed approach would yield the same result
as to the Bible story, but a different result as to the Thanksgiving poster.
With Peck and Poling, meanwhile, my proposed approach would lead to the same
ultimate result, but on somewhat different grounds. In Peck, as noted above, the Second
Circuit took the opportunity to rule that Hazelwood generally prohibited viewpoint-based
restrictions. Under this article’s approach, by contrast, the concealment of the Jesus
figure on the student’s poster would be unconstitutional not because viewpoint-based
discrimination is always prohibited by Hazelwood, but because the context there was
insufficiently suggestive of school imprimatur to warrant the speech restriction.
Finally, as to Poling, the school officials’ discipline of the student would be
entirely permissible under my proposed approach. That is because the discipline, at least
as the school officials explained it, stemmed not from opposition to the views expressed
by the student, but rather from the conclusion that the student’s mockery of the assistant
principal’s stuttering had been rude and in poor taste.305 Given that the speech restriction
at issue was not viewpoint-based, my proposed approach would require it only to be
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. By contrast, had the student
simply criticized the administration’s “iron grip” on the school without using personally
derogatory language, and had the school still punished him, then such discipline would
clearly have been based on the substance of the student’s anti-administration viewpoint.
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Under my proposed approach, such a viewpoint-based restriction would be subject to
heightened scrutiny (due to the low-imprimatur setting), and would not likely pass
constitutional muster, given the lack of any apparent important pedagogical purpose.

VI.

Conclusion
In arguing that Hazelwood’s reach has been significantly over-extended, I

asserted above that a “one-size-fits-all” approach to Hazelwood is destined for failure.
Hazelwood was designed specifically to evaluate restrictions on school-sponsored student
speech, and courts should limit its application to that context, applying general public
forum doctrine to outside entities’ speech in school-sponsored settings and Pickering to
teachers’ classroom speech. The confusion and dissension over whether Hazelwood
permits viewpoint-based restrictions has been an unfortunate byproduct of its overextension.
But even within Hazelwood’s core of student speech, a one-size-fits-all approach
to the viewpoint discrimination issue is not the best method. Hazelwood itself arose from
the Supreme Court’s recognition that context matters. Just as the existence of schoolsponsorship determines whether Tinker or Hazelwood applies in the first place, so too
should the level of school sponsorship guide courts in determining exactly how
Hazelwood should apply to each particular case. A more nuanced alignment between the
perception of school imprimatur and the level of judicial scrutiny applied to viewpointbased restrictions, through the sliding-scale approach that I have proposed, will help
fulfill the underlying rationale of the Tinker/Hazelwood regime and restore balance to
school officials’ treatment of student speech.
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